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                            ----------  
  
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
  Plaintiffs Angel Ortiz, Project Vote!, and Service 
Employees International Union (collectively "Ortiz") brought suit 
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania seeking to enjoin the City of Philadelphia ("City") 
from implementing Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law as 
violative of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  The district court 
denied Ortiz's request for a permanent injunction and Ortiz 
appealed.  We have jurisdiction over Ortiz's appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Finding no merit to Ortiz's legal arguments, 
we will affirm. 
 
I 
 Pennsylvania law provides that registered voters who 
fail to vote for two years shall be purged from the registration 
rolls after being provided notice of the same.  25 Pa. Cons. 
3 
Stat. § 623-40.0  In the summer of 1991, approximately 21 percent 
of Philadelphia's registered voters (193,000 voters) were slated 
                     
0
 Section 623-40 provides as follows: 
 
 During each year, the commission shall cause all 
of the district registers to be examined, and in the 
case of each registered elector who is not recorded as 
having voted at any election or primary during the two 
calendar years immediately preceding, the commission 
shall send to such elector by mail, at his address 
appearing upon his registration affidavit, a notice, 
setting forth that the records of the commission 
indicate that he has not voted during the two 
immediately preceding calendar years, and that his 
registration will be cancelled if he does not vote in 
the next primary or election or unless he shall, 
within ten days of the next primary or election, file 
with the commission, a written request for 
reinstatement of his registration, signed by him, 
setting forth his place of residence.  A list of the 
persons to whom such notices shall have been mailed 
shall be sent promptly to the city chairman of the 
political party of which the electors were registered 
as members.  At the expiration of the time specified 
in the notice, the commission shall cause the 
registration of such elector to be cancelled unless he 
has filed with the commission a signed request for 
reinstatement of his registration as above provided. 
The official registration application card of an 
elector who has registered may qualify as a 
reinstatement of his registration or a removal notice. 
The cancellation of the registration of any such 
elector for failure to vote during two immediately 
preceding calendar years shall not affect the right of 
any such elector to subsequently register in the 
manner provided by this act. 
 
 Whenever the registration of an elector has been 
cancelled through error, such elector may petition the 
commission for reinstatement of his registration not 
later than the tenth day preceding any primary or 
election, and after a hearing on said application, if 
error on the part of the commission is proved, the 
commission shall reinstate the registration of such 
elector. 
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to be purged from Philadelphia's registration rolls for failing 
to vote. 
 On October 25, 1991, Ortiz filed an action alleging 
that the non-voting purge act had a disparate impact on minority 
voters and, thus, violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, the First and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the United States Constitution, and the Pennsylvania Election 
Law, 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. 623-40.  Ortiz sought a judicial 
declaration that the purge violated the aforementioned 
provisions, as well as an injunction directing the City to 
restore all purged voters to the City's voter registration rolls, 
and enjoining the City from any further purging of non-voting, 
registered voters. 
 On October 29, 1991, the district court denied Ortiz's 
motion for a preliminary injunction.  No appeal was taken.  One 
month prior to the November 1992 elections, Ortiz again sought a 
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction and an 
immediate hearing on the merits.  This request was denied by 
order of the district court on October 6, 1992.  Ortiz filed a 
petition for writ of mandamus (92-1821) and notices of appeal 
(92-1822 and 92-1839) from the district court's order, as well as 
a motion for injunction pending appeal, a motion for expedited 
appeal, and a motion for permanent injunction.  We denied Ortiz's 
motions and petition for writ of mandamus on October 8 and 14, 
1992.  Ortiz's appeals were dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
 On November 10, 1992, a four-day trial was held to 
determine whether a permanent injunction should issue.  On June 
5 
1, 1993, the district court granted judgment in favor of the 
City, denying Ortiz's requested relief.  Ortiz v. City of 
Philadelphia, 824 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  After making 
extensive findings of fact, and recognizing that African-American 
and Latino voters are purged at disproportionately higher rates 
than their white counterparts, id. at 526-31,0 the district court 
held that the purge law did not deprive minority voters of equal 
access to the political process in violation of Section 2.  Id. 
at 539. 
 Ortiz appeals the denial of his Section 2 claim.0 
 
II 
 Ortiz argues that the district court failed to apply 
the correct standard in concluding that he had failed to 
                     
0
 Ortiz's expert testified to the following disparities 
in the rates at which white and minority voters in the City of 
Philadelphia were slated to be purged, and estimated rates at 
which they actually were purged: 
 
Philadelphia Voters 
% Slated For Purging / Estimated Purge Rates 
 Whites African-American + Other 
1989 4.1% / 3.9% 4.5% / 4.0% 
1990 8.5% / 7.9% 11.7% / 11.1% 
1991 17.3% / 13.2% 24.7% / 20.8% 
1992 6.4% / 6.4% 6.6% / N/A 
 
0
 Ortiz has abandoned his claims under the United States 
Constitution and state law.  In addition, we note that Ortiz's 
complaint was filed with respect to the 1991 election.  Of 
course, both the purge preceding that election, and the election 
itself, have already occurred.  Nevertheless, neither of the 
parties have argued that the issues presented on appeal are moot, 
nor could they so argue, inasmuch as Ortiz's complaint is 
"capable of repetition yet evading review."  Weinstein v. 
Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975). 
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demonstrate that the purge statute violated Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act.  In particular, Ortiz asserts that the 
district court erred in finding that he had failed to prove that 
the purge statute caused minority voters to be removed from the 
voter-registration rolls at disparate rates. 
 
A. 
 A district court's conclusion that a challenged 
electoral practice has a discriminatory effect is a question of 
fact subject to review for clear error, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 
U.S. 30, 79 (1986) (recognizing that determination of whether or 
not political process is equally open to minority voters "is 
peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case and requires an 
'intensely local appraisal of the design and impact' of the 
contested electoral mechanisms").  The question of which standard 
(i.e., which individual factors) a district court should apply in 
determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a 
challenged electoral practice has a discriminatory effect, how-
ever, presents a question of law subject to plenary review.  Id. 
Accord Jenkins v. Red Clay Consolidated School District Board of 
Education, 4 F.3d 1103, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
B. 
 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted to enforce 
the Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which 
provides: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
7 
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude." 
 In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act "to make clear that certain practices and procedures 
that result in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote are 
forbidden even though the absence of proof of discriminatory 
intent protects them from constitutional challenge."  Chisom v. 
Roemer, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2358 (1991) (holding that 
state judicial elections are included within the scope of Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act).  That is, "Congress made clear that 
a violation of § 2 could be established by proof of 
discriminatory results alone."  Id. at 2368. 
 As amended, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
provided as follows: 
 (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to 
voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be 
imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United 
States to vote on account of race or color, or in 
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 
1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection 
(b) of this section. 
 (b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section 
is established if, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, it is shown that the political 
processes leading to nomination or election in the 
State or political subdivision are not equally open to 
participation by members of a class of citizens 
protected by subsection (a) of this section in that 
its members have less opportunity than other members 
of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice. 
The extent to which members of a protected class have 
been elected to office in the State or political 
subdivision is one circumstance which may be 
considered: Provided, That nothing in this section 
establishes a right to have members of a protected 
8 
class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in 
the population. 
(Emphasis added). 
 In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), a case 
which did not involve a purge act, black citizens of North 
Carolina brought suit challenging that state's legislative 
redistricting plan on the grounds that the plan impaired black 
citizens' ability to elect representatives of their choice in 
violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  The district 
court, applying the "totality of the circumstances" test set 
forth in § 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act, held that the 
redistricting plan violated the Act because it resulted in the 
dilution of black citizens' votes in all of the disputed election 
districts. 
 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the 
district court with respect to all of the disputed districts 
except one.  In so ruling, the Court held that to determine 
"whether 'as a result of the challenged practice or structure 
plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the 
political processes and to elect candidates of their choice,'" a 
court must "assess the impact of the contested structure or 
practice on minority electoral opportunities 'on the basis of 
objective factors.'"  Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 44. 
 The Senate Judiciary Committee Report that accompanied 
the bill amending Section 2 enumerated a non-exclusive list of 
factors relevant to a Section 2 claim: the history of official 
voting-related discrimination in the State or political sub-
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division; the extent to which voting in the elections of the 
State or political subdivision is racially polarized; the extent 
to which the State or political subdivision has used electoral 
practices that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimina-
tion; whether minorities have been excluded from any candidate 
slating process; the extent to which minority groups bear the 
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment 
and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively 
in the political process; the extent to which political campaigns 
have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; the 
extent to which minority members have been elected to public 
office; whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on 
the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of 
minority groups; whether the policy underlying the use of such 
voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice or procedure is tenuous.  S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 28-30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177 ("S. 
Rep."). 
 Although in Thornburg v. Gingles the Supreme Court 
proceeded to weigh these factors, the Court also recognized that 
the Senate Judiciary Committee list was, in fact, "neither 
comprehensive nor exclusive," 478 U.S. at 45 (1986), and that 
"there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be 
proved, or that a majority of them point one way or another." 
Id., quoting S. Rep. at 29.  That is, both the Court and the 
Committee recognized that other factors might be relevant to the 
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determination of whether, under the totality of the circum-
stances, a given electoral procedure was discriminatory. 
 On this much, the parties agree.  Ortiz argues, 
despite the allegations in his complaint, that the district court 
completely negated the totality of the circumstances test set out 
by Section 2 in holding that if the purge statute was not "the 
dispositive force depriving minorities of equal access to the 
political process" then, under the "totality of the circum-
stances," there was no violation of the Voting Rights Act.0 
 The City argues that the district court did not err in 
requiring Ortiz to show that the purge statute caused minority 
voters to have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice. 
 
C. 
 The primary legal issue before us, then, is whether 
the district court erred by factoring into its "totality of the 
circumstances" analysis the question of whether or not the purge 
statute caused minorities to be deprived of equal access to the 
political system. 
 
                     
0
 As we read the district court's opinion, we construe 
it to mean that where, as here, a Section 2 plaintiff seeks to 
abolish or invalidate a particular election practice, such as a 
purge law, and pinpoints the particular practice in its 
complaint, the plaintiff necessarily must demonstrate and 
establish by evidence that the particular practice causes the 
alleged discrimination. 
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1. 
 The Supreme Court wrote in Thornburg v. Gingles that 
"[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, 
practice, or structure interacts with social and historical 
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by 
black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives." 
478 U.S. at 47 (1986) (emphasis added).  That is, the Supreme 
Court recognized that there must be some causal connection 
between the challenged electoral practice and the alleged 
discrimination that results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right to vote. 
 Three Courts of Appeal have required Section 2 
plaintiffs to demonstrate a causal connection between asserted 
indicia of discrimination and the challenged electoral procedure 
at issue.  In Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986), 
the plaintiffs argued that a Tennessee law which disenfranchised 
convicted felons had a disproportionate impact on blacks because 
a significantly higher number of black Tennesseeans are convicted 
of felonies than whites.  The Court of Appeals rejected this 
argument, despite the district court's findings that there 
existed in Tennessee "a history of racial discrimination, the 
effects of which continue to the present day."  Id. at 1261.  The 
court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
presence of some of the factors enumerated in the legislative 
history of Section 2 was outweighed by other factors such as the 
state's legitimate and compelling rationale for enacting the 
statute at issue.  The court concluded that "the disproportionate 
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impact suffered by black Tennesseeans does not 'result' from the 
state's qualification of the right to vote on account of race or 
color and thus the Tennessee Act does not violate the Voting 
Rights Act."  Id. at 1262. 
 In Irby v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 889 F.2d 
1352, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1989), the Fourth Circuit upheld a 
district court's finding that Virginia's appointive system for 
selection of school board members did not violate Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act.  That is, the Court of Appeals agreed with 
the district court's conclusion that, despite the existence of a 
"significant disparity" between the percentage of blacks in the 
population and the percentage of blacks on the school board, 
"[t]he evidence cast considerable doubt on the existence of a 
causal link between the appointive system and black 
underrepresentation in Buckingham and Halifax counties."  Id. at 
1359.  Rather, the disparity arose from the fact that "although 
blacks comprise a large portion of the population, they are not 
seeking school board seats in numbers consistent with their 
percentage of the population."  Id. at 1358, quoting, 693 F. 
Supp. 424, 434 (E.D. Va. 1988). 
 Finally, in Salas v. Southwest Texas Junior College 
District, 964 F.2d 1542 (5th Cir. 1992), Hispanic voters 
challenged the use of an at-large system, as opposed to single 
member districts.  The Fifth Circuit held that "the district 
court's ultimate finding that the cause of Hispanic voters' lack 
of electoral success is failure to take advantage of political 
opportunity, rather than a violation of § 2," was not clearly 
13 
erroneous.  Id. at 1556.0  Noting that evidence introduced at 
trial showed that Hispanic voter turnout was roughly seven 
percentage points below that of Anglo-Saxon whites, the Court of 
Appeals agreed that "[o]bviously, a protected class is not 
entitled to § 2 relief merely because it turns out in a lower 
percentage than whites to vote."  Id.0 
                     
0
 The dissent's attempt to distinguish Salas misses the 
mark.  See Dissent typescript at 28.  Although the Court of 
Appeals in Salas did address the issue of whether or not a 
minority group which constitutes a majority of registered voters 
may bring a claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
concluding that it could, the court proceeded to consider the 
validity of the plaintiffs' claim on the merits, and stressed the 
need for the plaintiffs to establish that the challenged practice 
(i.e., the at-large system) caused the electoral dilution. 
 After delineating the court's responsibility to 
analyze the impact of a challenged practice, and the plaintiffs' 
burden to prove that the practice denied them the opportunity to 
elect their preferred representatives, the Fifth Circuit noted 
that "[u]nderlying these functions of the court and the 
plaintiffs in a multimember district vote dilution case is an 
inquiry into causation--whether the given electoral practice is 
responsible for plaintiffs' inability to elect their preferred 
representatives."  964 F.2d at 1554 (5th Cir. 1992). 
0
 We note that the legislative history of the 1982 
amendment also supports this construction of Section 2.  For 
example, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report summarized the 
amendment's effect as follows: 
 
If as a result of the challenged practice or structure 
plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to 
participate in the political process and to elect 
candidates of their choice, there is a violation of 
this section. 
 
Sen R. at 28 (emphasis added).  We read this language to provide 
that Congress intended that any alleged denial of equal access to 
the political process be the "result of the challenged practice 
or structure." 
 The Report also stresses that the ultimate test for 
both permanent structural barriers to political participation, as 
well as episodic barriers, would be the standard enunciated by 
the Supreme Court in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and 
codified by Congress in its 1982 amendment of Section 2: 
14 
 
2. 
 We agree that Section 2 plaintiffs must show a causal 
connection between the challenged voting practice and the 
prohibited discriminatory result.  Ortiz's argument to the 
contrary is without legal foundation, devoid of endorsement in 
existing caselaw and the legislative history of Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, and is not supported by evidence.  In the 
present case, the district court properly considered whether or 
not Pennsylvania's non-voting purge statute0 caused the 
discrimination of which Ortiz complained. 
 
III 
A. 
                                                                  
"whether, in the particular situation, the practice operated to 
deny the minority plaintiff an equal opportunity to participate 
and to elect candidates of their choice."  Sen. R. at 30 
(emphasis added) (accompanying footnote discussed below).  This 
language informs us that the Senate Judiciary Committee expected 
that courts ultimately would focus on the challenged procedure 
and its causal effects on equal opportunity to participate in the 
political process. 
 Finally, the footnote accompanying the above-quoted 
text states that "purging of voters could produce a 
discriminatory result if fair procedures were not followed, Toney 
v. White, 488 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1973), or if the need for a 
purge were not shown or if opportunities for re-registration were 
unduly limited."  S. Rep. at 30 n. 119.  Thus, the Committee 
acknowledged that a purge statute which, itself, produced a 
discriminatory result, by virtue of the manner in which it was 
administered, might violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 
Implicitly, however, the Committee recognized that a purge 
statute which was administered fairly, and in an even-handed 
manner, would not run afoul of the law. 
0
 See, supra, note 1. 
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 Ortiz argues that the district court erred in holding 
that, under the totality of the circumstances, Ortiz had "failed 
to demonstrate that the purge law interacts with social and 
historical conditions to deny minority voters equal access to the 
political process and to elect their preferred representatives." 
Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 539 (E.D. Pa. 1993).0  As previously 
observed, the ultimate question of whether a challenged electoral 
procedure has a discriminatory effect is a question of fact which 
we review for clear error.  See, supra, Section II(A). 
 The district court made extensive findings with 
respect to the aforementioned objective factors delineated in the 
Senate Judiciary Committee Report.  The district court found that 
there was racially polarized voting in Philadelphia, Ortiz, 824 
F. Supp. at 532-33, and a "general pattern" of racial appeals in 
some Philadelphia political campaigns.  Id. at 536-37.  The court 
found that there were "substantial socioeconomic disparities 
among African-American, Latino and white residents of the City of 
                     
0
 Ortiz challenges a number of the district court's 
underlying factual findings.  In particular, Ortiz argues that 
the district court erred in finding that the City's failure to 
send out bilingual "intent to purge" notices, in violation of an 
order in Arroyo v. Tucker, 372 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974), did 
not have a discriminatory impact on the ability of Latino voters 
to equally participate in the political process.  Ortiz also 
claims that the district court erred in finding that minority 
voters did not suffer a disproportionate burden of re-
registration, and that the disproportionate placement of older 
voting machines in minority wards did not have a discriminatory 
impact on minority voters. 
 None of these findings of fact were clearly erroneous. 
In any event, they are subsumed by the district court's ultimate 
factual determination that Ortiz had failed to establish that the 
purge statute caused minority voters to be purged at a 
disproportionate rate. 
16 
Philadelphia, which affect the ability of these minority groups 
to participate in the political process and to elect their 
candidates of choice."  Id. at 535.0  In addition, the court 
found that the needs of minority citizens have not always been 
adequately addressed by city officials, and that this factor, as 
well as the impact of various socioeconomic factors, could 
influence minority participation in the political process.  Id. 
at 538. 
 Nevertheless, the district court found that there was 
no evidence of historical voting-related discrimination 
infringing upon the rights of Latinos or African-Americans to 
vote.  Id. at 531-32.  There was no evidence of discrimination in 
the candidate slating process that denied minority candidates 
equal access to the political process.  Id. at 533.  Nor was 
there evidence that minorities experience difficulty in electing 
representatives of their choice.  Id. at 537-38.0 
 Finally, the district court found that the policy 
reasons underlying the City's implementation of the voter purge 
were substantial and were based upon a valid state interest of 
                     
0
 In particular, the district court found disparities in 
the rates of educational attainment, home ownership, housing 
discrimination, health care coverage, employment, and income 
among African-Americans and Latinos in comparison to the general 
population of the City of Philadelphia.  The court also found 
that minority voters in Philadelphia do not exercise their right 
to vote to the same extent as white voters, which in part may be 
attributable to discrimination and the overall socioeconomic 
status of minorities in Philadelphia.  Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 
533-35. 
0
 See, infra, note 16, and accompanying text. 
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ensuring that elections in Philadelphia are not plagued with 
fraud.  Id. at 538-39. 
 Ultimately, the district court concluded that Ortiz 
had failed to establish a per se violation of Section 2: 
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the purge 
law interacts with social and historical conditions to 
deny minority voters equal access to the political 
process and to elect their preferred representatives, 
particularly since it is undisputed that the purge 
procedure is administered fairly and that there is 
ample opportunity for purged voters to re-register to 
vote.  Although it is clear that the operation of the 
purge law removes African-American and Latino voters 
from the voter registration rolls at higher rates than 
white voters, this disproportionate impact does not 
rise to the level of a per se violation of § 2, even 
when considered in light of the court's findings of 
the existence of racially polarized voting, 
socioeconomic disparities in education, employment and 
health, racial appeals in some elections, and the 
failure of the City in some instances to address the 
needs of minority citizens.  While it is clear that 
these factors may contribute to decreased minority 
political participation rates, plaintiffs' evidence 
simply does not justify the conclusion that the purge 
law is the dispositive force in depriving minority 
voters of equal access to the political process in 
violation of § 2. 
Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 539.0 
 
B. 
 We hold that the district court did not err in 
concluding that Ortiz had failed to show that Philadelphia's 
minority population has had less opportunity than other members 
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to 
                     
0
 Examining the district court's opinion as a whole, it 
is apparent that the court's use of the phrase "the dispositive 
force" means a cause which, in that context, would be legally 
dispositive. 
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elect representatives of their choice, as a result of 
Pennsylvania's purge statute. 
 The Supreme Court has stated categorically that the 
right to vote is of the very essence of democratic society.  Shaw 
v. Reno, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2822 (1993), quoting 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).  Although we are 
mindful of the fact that it was not until relatively late in our 
nation's history that this right was extended to every American 
citizen, without regard to race, we note that the Fifteenth 
Amendment, the Voting Rights Act, and numerous judicial decisions 
all have sought to raze any enduring historical bastions of 
state-administered voter discrimination. 
 Here, however, it is not the State which prevents 
citizens from exercising their right to vote, from participating 
in the political process, and from electing representatives of 
their own choosing.  We are not confronted with an electoral 
device -- such as "race-neutral" literacy tests, grandfather 
clauses, good-character provisos, racial gerrymandering, and vote 
dilution -- which discriminates against minorities, which has no 
rational basis, and which is beyond the control of minority 
voters.  Rather, we are faced with the fact that, for a variety 
of historical reasons, minority citizens have turned out to vote 
at a statistically lower rate than white voters.0 
                     
0
 The following statistics, upon which the district 
court relied, Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 536 (E.D. Pa. 1993), are 
illuminative: 
 
Voter Registration and Voter Turnout in General Elections 
by Year and Ethnicity 
 Eligible Voters Actual Voters Percentage 
19 
 As we read Ortiz's complaint, the entire document is 
drawn to allege that Pennsylvania's purge statute "caused" the 
disparate purge rates between Philadelphia's white and minority 
communities.  Yet, there is nothing before us, not even one iota 
of evidence introduced at trial or present in the record, which 
would establish that fact, despite the claims made by the 
dissent. 
 On the contrary, it is well established that purge 
statutes are a legitimate means by which the State can attempt to 
prevent voter fraud.0  More importantly, registered voters are 
                                                                  
Ye
ar 
White Black Other White Black Other White Blac
k 
Other 
19
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529,863 370,768 56,143 369,76
3 
249,14
1 
27,888 69.7 67.2 48.6 
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408,143 267,172 120,64
2 
155,98
7 
155,98
7 
53,936 67.2 58.3 44.7 
 
0
 For example, the Fourth Circuit stated as follows in 
rejecting a constitutional challenge to Maryland's voter purge 
statute: 
 
The statute in question here is designed to curb vote 
fraud.  It removes from the registered voter list 
those who have moved without notifying the voter 
registration board, those who have died when the city 
has not been notified of such deaths, and those who 
have become disqualified as a result of conviction for 
infamous crime if the city did not receive notice of 
such convictions.  Without removing the names, there 
exists the very real danger that impostors will claim 
to be someone on the list and vote in their places. 
And the absent voting statutes open the door for vote 
fraud by this means.  Accordingly, keeping accurate, 
reliable and up-to-date voter registration lists is an 
important state interest. . . . Even considering that 
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purged -- without regard to race, color, creed, gender, sexual 
orientation, political belief, or socioeconomic status -- because 
they do not vote, and do not take the opportunity of voting in 
the next election or requesting reinstatement.0 
 It is true that in certain years minority voters have 
turned out in proportionately lower numbers than have non-
minority voters.  But the purge statute did not cause the 
statistical disparities which form the basis of Ortiz's 
complaint.  We agree with the Fifth Circuit that "a protected 
class is not entitled to § 2 relief merely because it turns out 
in a lower percentage than whites to vote."  Salas v. Southwest 
Texas Junior College District, 964 F.2d 1542, 1556 (5th Cir. 
1992). 
 
C. 
                                                                  
re-registration may be somewhat burdensome, it is a 
small price to pay for the prevention of vote fraud. 
 
Hoffman v. Maryland, 928 F.2d 646, 649 (4th Cir. 1991).  See also 
Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973) (recognizing 
that "preservation of the integrity of the electoral process is a 
legitimate and valid state goal"); Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 
1514, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing legitimate state 
interest in preventing electoral fraud).  See, infra, discussion 
at 27-30. 
0
 We note that the procedures for re-registering to vote 
are identical to those for registering in the first place; 
therefore, they are no more complicated, burdensome, or 
discriminatory than the requirement of initial registration.  See 
Williams v. Osser, 350 F. Supp. 646, 653 (E.D. Pa. 1972) 
(recognizing that "[t]he burden [of re-registration under the 
non-voting purge law] does not nearly approach the requirements 
of initial registration.") 
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 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act requires minority 
claimants to prove that they "have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political process 
and to elect representatives of their choice."  Chisom v. Roemer, 
___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2365 (1991).  That is, Section 2 
plaintiffs must demonstrate that they had less opportunity both 
(1) to participate in the political process, and (2) to elect 
representatives of their choice.  In Chisom, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
Any abridgement of the opportunity of members 
of a protected class to participate in the 
political process inevitably impairs their 
ability to influence the outcome of an 
election. . . . [H]owever, the inability to 
elect representatives of their choice is not 
sufficient to establish a violation unless, 
under the totality of the circumstances, it 
can also be said that the members of the 
protected class have less opportunity to 
participate in the political process. 
111 S. Ct. at 2365 (holding that state judicial elections fall 
within the scope of Voting Rights Act). 
 In contrast to the situation discussed by the Court in 
Chisom, here the district court not only made a finding of 
minority participation in the political process, Ortiz, 824 F. 
Supp. at 539, but it also made an explicit finding of fact that 
Philadelphia's minority population has not had difficulty 
electing minority representatives.  Id. at 537-38.  In fact, 
despite the dissent's charges, there is no evidence in the record 
that minorities have been denied fair access to the political 
process in the City of Philadelphia, nor is there any evidence 
that the purge law "impairs their ability to influence the 
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outcome of an election."  Chisom, 111 S.Ct. at 2365.0  To the 
contrary, a minority candidate, Wilson Goode, had won election to 
two four-year terms as Mayor of the City of Philadelphia, in 1983 
and 1987, and the district court found that the Philadelphia City 
Council consistently has had a strong minority presence, 
including seven of the seventeen council seats at the time the 
district court issued its opinion.0 
                     
0
 The dissent quotes footnote 117 from the Senate 
Judiciary Committee Report as follows: "[E]ven a consistently 
applied practice premised on a racially neutral policy would not 
negate a plaintiff's showing through other factors that the 
challenged practice denies minorities fair access to the 
process."  Dissent typescript at 35.  Ortiz, however, has failed 
to prove that "the challenged practice [i.e., the purge statute] 
denies minorities fair access to the process." 
0
 The district court included in its opinion the 
following germane statistics with respect to minority 
representation in the Pennsylvania legislature: 
 
Representatives from Philadelphia in the State 
House and Senate 
by percentage of minorities represented 
 House Senate 
Ye
ar 
Total Minority % Total Minority % 
197
9 
34 10 29% 8 3 32% 
198
0 
34 11 32% - - - 
198
2 
29 12 41% 7 3 42% 
198
5 
29 13 44% 7 3 42% 
198
6 
29 13 44% - - - 
198
8 
29 13 44% - - - 
199
0 
29 13 44% - - - 
199
2 
27 13 44% 7 3 42% 
 
23 
 These findings by the district court are not clearly 
erroneous.  Thus, we conclude that Ortiz, in failing to establish 
causation, has also failed to satisfy both elements of a Section 
2 cause of action and, accordingly, has failed to establish a 
basis upon which his requested relief could be granted. 
 
IV 
 The dissent argues at great length that societal 
conditions -- discrimination in housing, education, wages, etc. -
- constitute a totality of the circumstances with which the 
practice (the purge law) interacts to create inequality 
(discrimination).  The dissent, however, has overlooked the fact 
that the individuals to whom the purge law applies apparently 
have surmounted and overcome the societal disadvantages which it 
emphasizes, and have registered to vote at least once, if not 
more often.0  Had they continued to do so, the purge law could 
not have affected them, inasmuch as the purge law operates 
against only those who have registered to vote at least once, but 
then do not vote or register again.  Conversely, if individuals 
have never registered and have never voted, the purge law still 
                     
0
 Thus, the dissent's reliance on Mississippi State 
Chapter, Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 
1987), aff'd, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991), is misplaced.  See 
dissent typescript at 23-25.  In that case, Mississippi's onerous 
dual registration requirement, and prohibition on off-site voter 
registration, were the causes of black voters' registering at 
lower rates than white voters.  In the present case, no part of 
the purge statute prevents minority voters from registering to 
vote and from actually voting.  In fact, as mentioned in text, 
the statute only applies to those voters who already have 
registered to vote. 
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could not be applied to them because, as stated, the purge law 
affects only those who have once registered to vote. 
 Once having registered to vote, such individuals could 
not have been impeded by the practices which Ortiz claims have 
diluted their participation in the voting process.0  This may 
very well account for the fact that no reported case has ever 
dealt with a non-voting purge law as a racially discriminatory 
instrument in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
and the dissent, accordingly, has been unable to cite any such 
authority.  It certainly accounts for the result which the 
district court reached in the present case, and which we reach 
today.  The societal disadvantages cited by the plaintiffs and 
the dissent just are not relevant.  They are not relevant because 
they could not have diluted voting by a registrant or voter who 
had already registered and/or voted.  As previously stated, the 
record reveals no link between the societal conditions and 
factors recited by the dissent and the electoral practice (i.e., 
the purge law) challenged by Ortiz. 
 In addition, the dissent argues at length that "the 
City did not prove 'the need' for Pennsylvania's non-voting purge 
law," (Dissent typescript at 33), and that the City properly 
should have been required to do so.  The dissent derives such a 
requirement from footnote 119 in the Senate Judiciary Committee's 
Report,0 and its own analogy to Title VII disparate impact law.0  
                     
0
 See, supra, note 14. 
0
 Footnote 119 provides in relevant part as follows: 
"purging of voters could produce a discriminatory result if fair 
procedures were not followed, Toney v. White, 488 F.2d 310 (5th 
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However, no relevant authority has been cited for imposing such a 
burden upon the City.0  Even if there were such a requirement, we 
are satisfied that a review of the record and present reality 
demonstrates that the City's purge statute meets an important and 
                                                                  
Cir. 1973), or if the need for a purge were not shown or if 
opportunities for re-registration were unduly limited." (Emphasis 
added.)  In the present case, none of these qualifications are 
relevant, nor has Ortiz proved the presence of any of them. 
0
 In Title VII disparate impact cases, plaintiffs are 
permitted to come forward with evidence of less discriminatory 
alternatives to refute their employers' business justifications 
because such evidence "would belie a claim by [employers] that 
their incumbent practices are being employed for non-
discriminatory reasons."  Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 
U.S. 642, 660-61 (1989) (recognizing that employer's practice 
need not be "essential" or "indispensable" to the employer's 
business for it to pass muster as a business justification). 
Here, there is no allegation, no implication, no imputation, and, 
of greatest importance, no evidence, that the purge statute was 
enacted, or is being employed, by the City of Philadelphia for 
anything but nondiscriminatory reasons. 
 Moreover, even if the dissent was correct in drawing 
an analogy to Title VII jurisprudence -- an analogy which is 
inapposite -- we note that in Title VII cases, it is the 
plaintiff, not the defendant, as the dissent would have it, see 
Dissent typescript at 43, who, at all times, bears the burden of 
proving discrimination.  St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, ___ 
U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 
U.S. 321 (1977); Newark Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 940 
F.2d 792, 798 (3d Cir. 1991).  In the present case, Ortiz has 
failed to carry any such burden. 
0
 In Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 
1986), the Sixth Circuit did not require the State of Tennessee 
to show that its statute disenfranchising convicted felons was 
"necessary."  Nor could the State have made such a showing were 
it required to do so.  Rather, the Court of Appeals held: 
 
[T]he existence of other social and political factors 
present in this case leads to the inescapable 
conclusion that the Voting Rights Act was not 
violated.  Chief among those factors was the state's 
legitimate and compelling rationale for enacting the 
statute here in issue. 
 
Id. at 1261. 
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legitimate civic interest and is needed to prevent electoral 
fraud. 
 Notably, and of recent date, Philadelphia's Senate 
election, in which the Democratic candidate ostensibly had 
prevailed, was invalidated on the basis of findings that absentee 
votes cast by non-residents and deceased voters had been 
fraudulently obtained and counted.  See Marks v. Stinson, No. 93-
6157 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1994), vacated in part, 19 F.3d 873 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  Indeed, as recently as April 13, 1994, the 
Philadelphia Inquirer reported under the headline, "City Purging 
2d District Voter Rolls," that at least twenty-two individuals 
were "purged" because they either had died or no longer lived in 
the district but had, nevertheless, cast votes in the most recent 
election -- the very fraudulent acts which the purge statute was 
designed to overcome.0  Even the dissent acknowledges that 
                     
0
 That article recited in part: 
 
· The Board of Elections has begun purging 
the Second Senate District voting rolls of 
people who no longer live there -- including 
a woman whose vote was recorded after she 
died and another whose vote was cast while 
she lived on a Greek island. 
 
· Election officials said the 22 names --
including an individual who city 
investigators found living in New Jersey --
would immediately be purged from computerized 
voting rolls and notification would be 
delivered to the addresses on their voter 
registration. 
 
· Among the 22 people being purged in the 
Sixth Division of the 42d Ward is one 
individual who has been living in Las Vegas 
for two years, though a vote was cast in her 
27 
electoral fraud has been a part of Philadelphia's landscape for 
over 100 years.  See Dissent typescript at 39 n.22. 
 
V 
 In its final analysis, the dissent's rhetoric still 
fails to bridge the gap between the societal disadvantages which 
it catalogues at great length, and the purpose and effect of 
Philadelphia's non-voting purge act.  Once again, we emphasize 
that the sole purpose of that act is to prevent the very 
electoral fraud which can diminish the voting power of all 
citizens who have registered and voted, including registered and 
voting members of minority groups.  Despite the dissent's attempt 
to attribute society's voting ills to the purge act, neither the 
plaintiffs nor the dissent have been able to demonstrate that the 
purge act has had any effect whatsoever on any rights which are 
protected by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 
 The dissent repeatedly charges the purge act with 
discrimination against minorities.  See, e.g., Dissent typescript 
at 7, 47, 50.  Yet, not one word appears in the dissent to 
                                                                  
name in the November election without her 
knowledge, and a second individual who said 
he did not vote in any of the five 
Philadelphia elections in which ballots were 
cast for him since 1988. 
 
· Between 1988 and 1993, for example, at 
least 60 improper ballots were cast in the 
Sixth Division of the 42d Ward, 27 by machine 
and 33 by absentee ballot. 
 
Mark Fazlollah, City Purging 2d District Voter Rolls, Phila. 
Inquirer, April 13, 1994, at A1, A7. 
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substantiate such charges.  Of even greater importance, the 
entire record is devoid of evidence which could support such a 
conclusion.  It is not enough, in an attack on a non-voting purge 
law, simply to express distress over the very real societal 
disadvantages that afflict some members of minority groups.  Such 
sympathy and concern, though shared by all of us, are extraneous 
to the legal challenge mounted by Ortiz. 
 The dissent's single-minded focus on societal 
disadvantages might be entitled to somewhat greater weight in a 
suit challenging, not Philadelphia's purge act, but, perhaps, 
more generally, Philadelphia's voter registration procedures 
themselves.  It is apparent to us that the dissent, while 
charging the purge act with a discriminatory effect, essentially 
is railing against registration procedures not at issue here. 
 For example, if Ortiz had alleged that, because of 
disadvantages in education, housing, health, income, and the 
like, minority citizens could not afford to travel to 
registration centers, or in some other way avail themselves of 
registration opportunities, the dissent's essay might have some 
meaning.  But Philadelphia's voter registration laws, as a whole, 
are not under attack here.  The sole statute assailed by Ortiz is 
§ 623-40, the non-voting purge act.  That act operates only after 
a would-be registrant has overcome whatever societal obstacles, 
such as those detailed in the dissent, were in his path. 
 When, if ever, a claimant mounts an attack against 
Philadelphia's voter registration provisions, then and only then 
will it be the time to assess the legality of such procedures in 
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light of the societal disadvantages highlighted by the dissent. 
This case, this appeal, and our opinion, however, are not the 
time or place for such a discussion.  Until proofs can be 
assembled -- and we can think of none that are relevant -- to 
establish that a benign and neutral non-voting purge law 
discriminates against a particular class, we decline to 
invalidate such a statute. 
 
VI 
 We hold that the district court did not err in denying 
Ortiz's request for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. 
Therefore, we will affirm the district court's June 1, 1993 order 
granting judgment in favor of the City. 
 Costs will be taxed against the appellant, Ortiz. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, No. 93-1634 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
 Nothing undermines democratic government more quickly than fraudulent elections.  
Any practice that impairs a fair process or rigs the count devalues and dilutes the v
of each citizen, including each minority citizen, who has lawfully voted. Voter fraud, 
including the practice of voting dead or non-resident citizens, is no stranger to 
Pennsylvania, especially to the City of Philadelphia.  In 1937, the Pennsylvania Ge
Assembly made a judgment that a non-voting purge law was necessary to prevent voter fraud.  
25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 623-40 (1963 & 1993 Supp.).  Thirty-five years later, a three judge 
federal court upheld the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's law, based on the valid state 
interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process.  Williams v. Osser, 350 
F.Supp. 646 (1972).0  The court held that was a policy decision the General Assembly was 
                     
0As Judge Max Rosenn stated: 
 
 The principal state interest which the statute protects is the prevention 
of fraudulent voting. Maintaining voter rolls that include persons who no longer 
reside in a precinct, or who reside there but do not vote, conduces to fraud.  
Pennsylvania discovered that political operatives knowledgeable of the status of 
such registrants and weaknesses in the system were able to cast votes in the 
non-voters' names.  The two-year period allows removal of the names before the 
political operatives can take advantage of the situation.  If the period were 
four years instead of two, they would have greater opportunity to seize upon the 
registrant's non-voting status and defeat the purpose of the purge.  Such 
considerations led the state legislature to change the purge period from four to 
two years in 1941 after considerable public concern over voting fraud.  Mr. 
Welsh testified that the change was prompted by a suit instituted in 1940 by the 
Committee of Seventy, charging fraud by "phantom voters." 
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entitled to make.  In this statutory challenge, as set forth in the court's opinion, 
plaintiffs in this case  failed to prove the Pennsylvania law violated Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1971-73 (1988 & 1992 Supp.), in that 
minority citizens "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."  What 
is significant is that the concerns that led to the passage of the Pennsylvania law remain 
alive; as Judge Garth has noted, fraudulent voting in Philadelphia remains egregious and 
flagrant today. 
 For some time now, Congress and the state legislatures, concerned by low voting 
rates, have commendably sought to increase voter participation.  Last year, citing a 
steady decline of citizen participation in federal elections (except for 1992) and the 
penalty imposed on non-voters by removing their names from the rolls,0 Congress decided to 
promote voter registration by passing the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§1973gg (1994 Supp.).0  In the process, Congress sought to strike a balance between 
                                                                                          
 
Williams v. Osser, 350 F. Supp. 646, 652 (1972) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted.)  
Footnote 10, following this passage, stated: 
 
The court takes judicial notice that on April 8, 1941, a Special Federal Grand 
Jury presentment found that there were 50,000 ineligible voters on the 
Philadelphia registrations lists.  Of course, voting fraud was not a new problem 
at the time the two-year purge was enacted. 
 
Id. n.10 (citations omitted). 
 
0H.R. Rep. No. 9, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 107; 
S. Rep. No. 6, 103rd Cong. 1st Sess. 17 (1993). 
0It appears the Act, which applies to all federal elections, will take effect in 
Pennsylvania January 1, 1995. 
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facilitating registration and preventing fraudulent voting,0 but in the overall scheme, it 
appears the new Act will make it more difficult for the states to cull out ineligible 
voters and remove them from the rolls.0 
 Like the policy decision made by the Pennsylvania legislature to deter electoral 
fraud, the new Act represents a policy choice by Congress to promote registration and 
voter participation.  Absent practices that violate other statutes or the Constitution, 
such as unlawful discrimination, it is for the legislature to strike the balance here.
                     
0Congress stated the purposes of the Act as follows: 
 
       The purposes of this subchapter are-- 
 (1) to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens 
who register to vote in elections for Federal office; 
 (2) to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement 
this subchapter in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as 
voters in elections for Federal office; 
 (3) to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and 
 (4) to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.
 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1973gg(b). 
 
0Under the National Voter Registration Act, persons cannot become ineligible simply by 
failing to vote.  While directing states to make reasonable efforts to prevent fraud, the 
Act provides that any such state program or activity "shall not result in the removal of 
the name of any person from the official list of voters registered to vote in an election 
for Federal office by reason of the person's failure to vote."  42 U.S.C.A. §1973gg
6(b)(2). 
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Angel Ortiz, et al. v. City of Philadelphia Office of the City Commissioners Voter 
Registration, et al. 
No. 93-1634 
 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 Assuredly, much progress has been made since the enactment of the Voting Rights 
Act in 1965.  But in spite of the contributions the majority quite properly credits with 
eradicating many of the most glaring forms of discrimination in voting, the law has yet to 
ensure that members of minority groups will have an equal opportunity to participate in 
the political process.  We cannot pretend, and I do not read the majority opinion to 
suggest, that the discrimination prohibited by the Voting Rights Act has been relegated to 
an unfortunate but closed chapter of American history.  Discrimination and its effects 
remain a part of our present reality.  If we deny the continued existence of this problem, 
we not only lose our ability to recognize and remedy present instances of unlawful 
inequality; we also guarantee that discrimination and the damage it does to the integrity 
and effectiveness of democratic government will be a more prevalent and intractable 
feature of our country's future. 
 The majority and I share these broader concerns, but I have a different 
understanding of the way in which they are implicated in this case.  In my view, the 
district court erred in concluding that Pennsylvania's non-voting purge statute does not 
violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Moreover, the purge statute serves as a clear 
reminder that the law has yet to eliminate discrimination and its enduring effects in the 
area of voting.  For these reasons, I dissent. 
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 Because of my deep concerns about the impact that I fear today's decision will 
have, both on the residents of Philadelphia who will not be able to exercise their right 
to vote in upcoming elections, and on future efforts to properly apply the Voting Rights 
Act, I have set forth my views at considerable length. 
I. 
 Early every January, in keeping with Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law, the 
Voter Registration Division of Philadelphia's City Commissioners Office determines whether 
registered voters have voted during the previous two calendar years.  Those who have not 
done so are slated for purging.  After identifying these voters, the City sends them 
"intent to purge notices."  The notices, which are printed only in English, state: 
NOTICE OF FAILURE TO VOTE WITHIN TWO YEARS  Our Records indicate you 
have failed to vote for the last two years.  As required by law, we 
will cancel your Registration, unless you vote in the next Primary or 
Election or File with this Commission a written request for 
Reinstatement (10) ten days prior to the next Primary or Election, 
signed by you, giving your present residence.  This is the only notice 
you will receive. 
Appendix ("A.") at 362.  The address of the Voter Registration Division appears on the 
notices beneath this statement.0  The notices do not, however, provide any instructions as 
to how an individual might "File with this Commission a written request for 
Reinstatement," nor do they contain any information regarding what such a "request for 
Reinstatement" must contain (other than a signature and address). 
                     
0Additionally, in smaller type and without any explanation, "MU6-1500" appears in the 
upper left corner of the notices, and "MU6-1501" appears in the upper right 
corner.  At trial, Robert Lee, the Director of the Voter Registration Division, 
testified that those markings represent the Division's phone numbers. According 
to Lee, that was "obvious."  A. at 283.  Lee further testified that his office 
did receive calls from registered voters who asked for explanations of intent
to-purge notices that they had received.  A. at 286. 
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 Voters who are sent an intent to purge notice and who fail either to vote in the 
upcoming spring primary or to file a written request for reinstatement are purged from the 
registration rolls.  Once purged, an individual must re-register in order to vote in the 
future. 
 The non-voting purge has a substantially disparate impact on black and Latino 
Philadelphians.  The uncontroverted statistical evidence presented at trial, which the 
district court credited, showed that each year, greater percentages of black and Latino 
voters were slated for purging than were white voters. The evidence further showed that 
white voters were reinstated at higher rates than blacks and Latinos, thus increasing the 
adverse disparate impact on these minority groups as a result of the non-voting purge.  A. 
at 32-35. 
 The differences between the way this challenged voting practice affected Latinos 
and blacks, as compared to the way it affected whites, were substantial and consistent.  
According to the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Alan Lichtman, the statistical data showed that 
Pennsylvania's non-voting purge created a "clear and consistent pattern" of systematically 
purging black and Latino voters at significantly greater rates than whites.  See, e.g.
at 38-39 (testimony of Dr. Lichtman, describing the differences as far exceeding the 
standards of statistical significance, and as reflecting "systematic" results of the purge 
process); A. at 385, 394-95 (declaration of Dr. Lichtman, stating: "The disparate impact 
on minorities of Philadelphia's non-voting purge is both substantial and systematic, 
extending through a full four-year electoral cycle.").  Dr. Lichtman's expert analysis of 
the registration and purging statistics was uncontroverted and scientifically sound.  The 
district court, relying on his trial testimony and declaration, found that the expert 
7 
evidence "clearly reveals that African-American and Latino voters are slated for purging 
at higher rates than their white counterparts, and further, that minorities are purged at 
higher rates than white registrants."  Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 824 F. Supp. 514, 
530 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  "This finding," the court stated, "is not limited by the fact that 
there were fluctuations in the purge rate from year to year."  Id.0 
 The district court made a number of other factual findings, which the majority 
accurately recounts.  Particularly significant among those, for reasons I discuss below, 
the court found that Latino and black Philadelphians have suffered significant 
disadvantages in education, employment, housing, health care, and income.0  These 
"substantial socioeconomic disparities among African-American, Latino, and white residents 
                     
0
 In his declaration, based on the statistics that appear in the district court and 
majority opinions, Dr. Lichtman explained: "To put this [disparate impact of the 
non-voting purge] into perspective, if the black [purge] rate in 1991 had been 
as low as the white rate, about 28,000 fewer black registrants would have been 
[slated for purging] in 1991.  Conversely, if the white purge rate in 1991 had 
been as high as the black rate, about 41,000 more white registrants would have 
been [slated for purging] in 1991."  A. at 386.   
 
The 1991 purge was the largest of the four years studied, as it affected all 
registrants who had not voted since the 1988 presidential election.  About 21% of all 
registrants were slated for purging, and over 80% of those slated were ultimately 
purged.  (Again, whites reinstated themselves at higher rates than blacks and 
Latinos.)  According to Dr. Lichtman, the large numbers involved in the 1991 purge 
made that the "key year for assessing racially differential impact" of Pennsylvania's 
law.  A. at 385.  While the numbers of registrants purged, as well as the magnitude 
of the disparate impact, decreased in other years, that fact does not undermine the 
significance of the 1991 figures.  To the contrary, as Dr. Lichtman explained, "Given 
that a relatively smaller proportion of black than white registrants were available 
for purging after 1991, it is striking that in 1992 even a small difference between 
whites and blacks persists."  A. at 391. 
0
 In stating its findings with respect to housing and employment, the district court 
observed that the City has been held liable for practicing discrimination in 
these areas.  Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 533-35. 
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of the City of Philadelphia," the court concluded, "affect the ability of these minority 
groups to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice."  
Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 535.  In the court's view, that conclusion was "further supported 
by statistical evidence demonstrating that minority voters in Philadelphia do not exercise 
their right to vote to the same extent as white voters, which in part may be attributable 
to discrimination and the overall socioeconomic status of minorities in Philadelphia."  
Id. 
 The record thus shows that Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law operates to 
remove blacks and Latinos from Philadelphia registration rolls at substantially higher 
rates than whites.  In addition, it establishes that black and Latino Philadelphians 
suffer disadvantages and discrimination in various socioeconomic categories.  
Specifically, the findings indicate that members of these groups are less educated.  They 
are in poorer health, and they experience greater difficulty acquiring adequate medical 
care.  They own fewer homes.  They are less frequently employed. They have lower incomes.  
Finally, they do not vote as often. The district court even demonstrated its understanding 
of the relationship between these familiar facts: that socioeconomic disparities, which 
are linked to past and present discrimination, make members of minority groups less able 
and less likely to participate in the political process.  Prior to today's decision, I 
would have thought that given this proven reality, courts could easily appreciate the 
discriminatory effect of Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law, as well as the legal 
significance of that effect under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.   
II. 
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 In 1982, in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 
U.S. 55 (1980), Congress amended § 2 to make clear that in determining whether this 
provision of the Voting Rights Act has been violated, courts should apply the "results 
test" that the Supreme Court articulated in White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), rather 
than require plaintiffs to prove that a voting practice or procedure was motivated by 
discriminatory intent.  E.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).  Accordingly, 
§ 2(a) prohibits all states and political subdivisions from applying any qualification or 
prerequisite to voting, or any standard, practice, or procedure "in a manner which results
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote" who 
is a member of a protected class.  42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (emphasis added).  Section 2(b) 
sets forth the legal standard for meeting the results test adopted in § 2(a); drawn 
directly from the Court's language in White, § 2(b) states: 
A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality 
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to 
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not 
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens 
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity 
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).  Distilling the central meaning of this statutory language in 
Gingles, the Supreme Court stated: "The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral 
law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an 
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred 
representatives."  Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added).0 
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 The Gingles Court only referred to blacks because of the facts of that case.  Its 
discussion of § 2 applies equally to Latinos, who are also members of a 
protected class under the Voting Rights Act.  42 U.S.C. §§1973b(f)(2), 
1973l(c)(3). 
10 
 When Congress amended § 2, it instructed that in determining whether political 
processes remain equally open to members of protected groups, in the way the Act requires, 
courts must conduct "a searching practical evaluation of the `past and present reality.'"  
S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177 
("Sen. Rep.").0  The Supreme Court had taken such an approach in White, 412 U.S. at 769
70, and, following the 1982 amendments, it has emphasized the importance of the 
congressional mandate to maintain a searching practical perspective when evaluating the 
effects, and thus the lawfulness, of a challenged voting practice or procedure.  See
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45, 62-63, 66 (repeatedly quoting and following Congress's 
instruction to conduct a searching practical evaluation of reality in § 2 inquiries).  
Additionally, in expanding on this required approach, Congress instructed that in applying 
§ 2, courts should take a functional view of political processes as opposed to a 
formalistic one.  Sen. Rep. at 30 n.120; see also Jenkins v. Red Clay Consolidated School
Dist. Board of Education, 4 F.3d 1103, 1122 (3d Cir. 1993) ("The Senate Report repeatedly 
emphasizes that the court must evaluate plaintiffs' claims under `a searching practical 
evaluation of the past and present reality and on a functional view of the political 
process.'" (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45; omitting internal quotation and citation)), 
petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3396 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1993) (No. 93-812). 
 In keeping with this clearly expressed congressional intent, as well as with the
post-1982 Supreme Court and Third Circuit decisions which faithfully do so, we must take a 
functional rather than a formalistic view of political processes and the way in which they 
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 The Supreme Court has relied upon the Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee as the 
"authoritative source for legislative intent" behind the 1982 amendments. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43 n.7. 
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are affected by challenged voting measures.  Our understanding of what the Voting Rights 
Act means when it requires that such processes remain "equally open to participation" by 
members of a protected class must be informed by a searching practical evaluation of past 
and present reality. With this functional, practical, and realistic perspective --which, 
in my view, the majority fails to achieve -- we can then turn to the question that the 
Supreme Court has identified as the essence of a § 2 claim: whether "a certain electoral 
law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an 
inequality in the opportunities" enjoyed by members of racial and language minorities.  
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47. 
12 
A. 
 The majority devotes considerable effort to supporting the proposition that in 
order to prove a violation of § 2, plaintiffs must demonstrate "some causal connection 
between the challenged electoral practice and the alleged discrimination." Maj. Op. 
Typescript at 11.  In fact, in its view, that is the "the primary legal issue before us."  
Id.  I agree that § 2 plaintiffs must show a causal connection between the voting practice 
they challenge and the deprivation of equal political opportunity they allege.  This point 
-- which, I believe, the plaintiffs also accept0 -- is not open to question.  The language 
of the Voting Rights Act, the legislative history of the 1982 amendments, and controlling 
precedent all foreclose any argument that a voting practice can violate § 2 without 
resulting in, or playing some part in causing, the abridgement of citizens' voting rights.  
The majority, however, actually requires something more than and different from the causal 
connection it initially describes.  From its uncontroversial answer to what it presents as 
the primary legal question, it departs from and distorts the meaning of § 2. 
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 According to the majority, the plaintiffs have argued that they need not show a 
causal connection between a challenged voting practice and the discriminatory 
effect of which they complain.  Maj. Op. Typescript at 15.  That is not an 
accurate characterization of the plaintiffs' position.  In their brief, the 
plaintiffs insist that they have "never asserted that the discriminatory result 
need not be in part attributable to the purge."  Appellants' Brief at 41 n.8.  
The district court misunderstood them, they explain, when it formed the 
impression that they denied that causation was relevant to their claim.  
Neither the majority nor the City has advanced a waiver argument.  Thus, 
regardless of whether the plaintiffs ever took the untenable position for which 
they received credit in the district court, the important point, for present 
purposes, is that contrary to the majority's description of their argument, they 
have not denied the relevance of causation here. 
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 On two occasions, the district court stated that the plaintiffs had not proven a 
violation of § 2 because they had failed to demonstrate that "the purge law is the 
dispositive force in depriving minority voters of equal access to the political process . 
. . ."  Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 539 (emphasis added); see also id. at 524.  That is not the 
proper legal standard.  Section 2 does not require plaintiffs to prove that a challenged 
voting practice or procedure is "the dispositive force," or the only cause, or even the 
principal cause, of unequal political opportunity.  Neither the statute, nor its 
legislative history, nor the relevant case law supports such a reading.  To the contrary, 
that authority requires us to determine whether a challenged law interacts with other, 
external conditions to limit the political opportunities available to members of protected 
classes.  Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.  As White and § 2(b) state, we must consider the 
totality of the circumstances.  Those circumstances -- the "social and historical 
conditions" that make up the "past and present reality" surrounding political processes 
create the factual environment in which a challenged voting practice operates.  As such, 
they necessarily contribute to the effect that a practice has on individuals' political 
opportunities.  In order to properly apply § 2 in this case, we cannot require the 
plaintiffs to prove that Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law operates, by itself and 
independently of other circumstances, to produce discriminatory results.  The challenged 
law must certainly be a contributing cause of unequal opportunity, but it need not be, as 
the district court twice suggested, "the dispositive force."   
 At oral argument, the City conceded this point.  It did not defend the 
"dispositive force" language that appears in the district court's opinion, but instead 
argued that in spite of these erroneous comments, the court understood and applied the 
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proper legal standard.  To an extent, I am inclined to agree with that position.  A fair 
(though slightly charitable) reading of the district court's analysis reveals that, at 
least on occasion, it seems to have understood that while § 2 plaintiffs must demonstrate 
that a voting practice interacts with other, external circumstances to cause an actionable 
effect, such plaintiffs need not establish that the practice is the dispositive or even 
primary cause of the results giving rise to their claim.   
 The majority, however, in contrast to the City, does not in any way qualify its 
support for the district court's statements.0  Instead, it adopts the view that in order 
to have established a violation of § 2, the plaintiffs would have needed to prove that the 
non-voting purge operated independently of social and historical conditions to cause the 
inequality of which they complain.  Thus, the majority concludes that while black and 
Latino voters have turned out in lower numbers, the purge law did not cause that 
statistical disparity.  Maj. Op. Typescript at 21. And because the plaintiffs have not 
shown that the purge law itself has prevented members of minority groups from voting, they 
have failed to prove the kind of causation that the majority reads § 2 to require.  Under 
this construction, a challenged voting law is permissible unless it is entirely 
responsible for the abridgment of plaintiffs' political opportunities; if other factors 
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 The majority understands the phrase "the dispositive force," as the district court 
used it, to mean "a cause which, in that context, would be legally dispositive." 
Maj. Op. Typescript at 18 n.11.  I do not grasp the purpose or effect of this 
translation.  The majority does not disagree with the substance of the court's 
statements; instead, it reads § 2 to require proof of a "legally dispositive" 
cause, by which it means a single cause of all relevant circumstances, that is 
entirely responsible for the discriminatory effect of which a plaintiff 
complains.  There is no place, in the majority's construction of § 2, for 
contributing causes of inequality which are not themselves products of the 
challenged voting law.  As I explain below, I do share this view.   
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interact with the challenged law to bring about such a discriminatory result -- absent 
proof that those factors are themselves products of the law -- no violation of § 2 has 
occurred.0 
 Accordingly, the majority states that the discrimination and disadvantages that 
the plaintiffs experienced in education, employment, health care, housing, and income, 
which the district court found and documented, "just are not relevant." Maj. Op. 
Typescript at 25; see also id. at 29 (stating that societal disadvantages are "extraneous" 
to the plaintiffs' legal claim).  Such social and historical conditions do not matter, it 
explains, because "the record reveals no link", by which the majority means no causal 
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 Interestingly, while the majority first asserts that the plaintiffs have argued that 
causation is unimportant (see supra p. 10 n.6), it later claims that Ortiz's 
entire complaint "is drawn to allege that Pennsylvania's purge statute `caused' 
the disparate purge rates between Philadelphia's white and minority 
communities."  Maj. Op. Typescript at 19-20 (quotation unattributed); see also
Maj. Op. Typescript at 10 n.4 and accompanying text (perhaps suggesting that the 
plaintiffs' complaint improvidently endorsed the majority's construction of 
§ 2).  That would certainly be a curious way for a party who rejected the 
relevance of causation to plead a § 2 case.  In fact, the plaintiffs have never 
pleaded, accepted, or claimed to have met the legal standard of causation that 
the majority now adopts.  See Appellants' Brief at 37 (arguing that "[t]he Act 
does not require a demonstration that the practice in and of itself results in a 
discriminatory result," and claiming to have "demonstrated that historic, 
political, and socio-economic discrimination interacts with the non-voting purge 
to disproportionately disenfranchise Latinos and African-American voters"); 
at 14, 31, 41 n.8 (arguing that the purge law, operating in conjunction with 
social and historical conditions, was a contributing cause of the 
disproportionate purging of Latinos and blacks); see also A. at 18-20 
(plaintiffs' complaint, not pleading any view of § 2 causation). Nor have the 
plaintiffs pleaded or argued the opposite extreme -- that causation is 
irrelevant.  As they state in their brief, they accept that in order to prevail, 
they must show that the discriminatory result of which they complain must be 
attributable, in part, to the law they challenge.  Appellants' Brief at 41 & 
n.8.  Of course, even if the plaintiffs had taken either of the directly 
opposing erroneous positions the majority attributes to them, that would not 
require us to adopt an erroneous construction of § 2 in deciding this case.
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link, between those factors and the purge law.  Id. at 25.  After all, nothing in the 
record suggests that the non-voting purge makes black and Latino residents of Philadelphia 
so much worse off.  It is not the purge law that causes members of minority groups to vote 
less frequently, and therefore to lose the ability to vote more often by removing them at 
disproportionately high rates from the registration rolls. That is the kind of "legally 
dispositive" causal connection that the majority would require the plaintiffs to establish 
in order to prevail on their § 2 claim.0 
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 The majority's reading of the Senate Report casts additional light on the substance 
of its rationale.  In its view, the Report expresses the expectation that courts 
would "focus on the challenged procedure and its causal consequences . . 
Maj. Op. Typescript at 14 n.6.  The "focus" the majority has in mind, however, 
is quite restrictive; it encompasses nothing more than the challenged law, an
it excludes all other factors that the law has not created, but which 
nonetheless might contribute to the law's effect.  Thus, under the majority's 
reading of the Senate Report, Congress has instructed that § 2 might prohibit a 
purge statute which "itself" produces discriminatory results.  Id. 
 
 
The Senate Report does support the well-settled point that plaintiffs must prove a 
causal connection between the law they challenge and the discriminatory result they 
identify. Congress in no way, however, expressed any agreement with the majority's 
view that the challenged law must itself account for its unlawful effects.  According 
to the Senate Report, a court's "focus" must remain broad and varying enough to 
encompass the totality of the circumstances with which a voting practice invariably 
interacts to influence the nature of political processes. 
 
In concluding its opinion, the majority appears to abandon its causation argument.  
The dissent might have meaning, it states, in a § 2 challenge to registration 
procedures in which plaintiffs alleged that as a result of socioeconomic 
disadvantages, they experienced greater difficulty traveling to registration centers 
or in some other way availing themselves of registration opportunities.  Maj. Op. 
Typescript at 29.  That surprising comment cannot be reconciled with the majority's 
legal argument.  If the conditions of inequality the district court found here are 
extraneous to the plaintiffs' legal claim, those circumstances could not be relevant 
in the hypothetical suit the majority describes.  In neither case could members of a 
protected class show that the laws they challenged caused the practical difficulties 
they experienced.  In neither case would the laws themselves be responsible for their 
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 Finally, the majority reasons that this type of causation could not, under any 
circumstances, exist here, because a non-voting purge law, by its very nature, only 
affects people who have managed to register at least once.  Maj. Op. Typescript at 24
Such people, it points out, must have already demonstrated their ability to overcome 
whatever barriers might prevent them from participating in the political process, and any 
law that merely requires them to do so again could not violate §2.  Id.  The premise 
underlying this reasoning can only be that unless a law has prevented members of a 
protected class from ever having registered or cast a vote, it is permissible under the 
Voting Rights Act. 
          According to the Supreme Court, the essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain 
electoral law interacts with other circumstances to cause unequal political opportunity.  
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.  The majority takes a different position.  In its view, the 
essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law actually causes whatever 
circumstances might contribute to the deprivation of political equality of which a 
plaintiff complains. Respectfully, that is an unsupported and insupportable distortion of 
the Voting Rights Act with which I could not disagree more strongly. 
                                                                                          
disparately harmful effects on minority citizens.  Rather, under the majority's 
theory of § 2 causation, the unfortunate results of whatever registration laws it has 
in mind would merely represent another of "society's voting ills" that would not be 
subject to challenge under the Voting Rights Act. 
 
I do not know and cannot guess why the majority believes that I am actually concerned 
with Philadelphia registration procedures that the plaintiffs have not challenged, 
rather than with what I view as the discriminatory effect of the non-voting purge 
law.  I also cannot perceive a difference between the majority's hypothetical case 
where, it states, socioeconomic disadvantages might have meaning --and the one before 
us now.  In any event, I do not read the majority's conclusion as expressing any 
purposeful modification or qualification of its earlier analysis of § 2 causation.     
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 The majority offers a simple explanation for the fact that a disproportionately 
high number of Latinos and blacks have been removed from Philadelphia's registration 
rolls: minority citizens are purged more because they vote less.  The majority's reading 
of § 2 does not require it to know anything more about the underlying causes of the law's 
effect.  It need not look any deeper, or any more closely.  It need not concern itself 
with why blacks and Latinos vote less; so long as the purge law itself is not responsible, 
no violation of § 2 has occurred.   
 The majority's explanation for the purge law's effect -- the fact that minority 
voters simply do not vote as often --does not explain much.  Rather, that fact lies near 
the surface of the past and present reality confronting members of minority groups who 
might try to participate in the political process.  As the district court demonstrated, it 
is not difficult to look beneath the surface.  And contrary to the majority's view, that 
inquiry is not only important, but necessary.  The majority has erred in concluding that 
§ 2 does not require a more searching evaluation of the reasons why Latinos and bla
not vote as often. 
 The district court recognized that the lower minority turnout statistics "may in 
part be attributable to discrimination and the overall socioeconomic status of minorities 
in Philadelphia."  Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 535.  And regardless of any uncertainty the 
court had about the relationship between discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantages, 
on the one hand, and lower participation rates, on the other, Congress and the Supreme 
Court have provided answers.  The Senate Report states that, as the Court observed in 
White, disadvantages in education, employment, income levels, and living conditions 
arising from past discrimination tend to depress minority political participation.  Sen. 
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Rep. at 29.  "Where these conditions are shown,"  the Report continues, "and where the 
level of black participation in politics is depressed, plaintiffs need not prove any 
further causal nexus between their socioeconomic status and the depressed level of 
political participation."  Id.0  
 As early as 1899, W.E.B. Du Bois described the barriers to meaningful political 
participation that black Philadelphians experienced as a result of their poverty, lack of 
education, and susceptibility to manipulation by local party organizations.  See W.E.B. Du 
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 Significantly, in White -- the case from which Congress borrowed the words that now 
make up § 2, and on which Congress relied most heavily in explaining what it 
intended that language to mean -- the Court did not look for or require any "link" 
between the challenged reapportionment plan and the factors that contributed to the 
plan's discriminatory effect.  White recounts, among other circumstances, the 
following findings: Texas had a "history of official racial discrimination . . ., 
which at times touched upon the right of Negroes to register and vote and 
participate in the democratic processes", 412 U.S. at 767; "the Bexar community, 
along with other Mexican-Americans in Texas, had long `suffered from, and continues 
to suffer from, the results and effects of invidious discrimination and treatment in 
the fields of education, employment, economics, health, politics, and others'", 412 
U.S. at 768 (footnote omitted; quoting district court opinion); and "[t]he typical 
Mexican-American suffers a cultural and language barrier that makes his 
participation in community processes extremely difficult . . . ." Id. (footnote 
omitted).  "The residual impact of this history," the Court observed, "reflected 
itself in the fact that Mexican-American voting registration remained very poor in 
the County . . . ."  Id.  Plainly, these social and historical conditions had not 
been brought about by a reapportionment plan that Texas promulgated in 1971.  
Rather, they interacted with the challenged multimember districts to result in 
invidious discrimination.  As the Supreme Court stated, "[b]ased on the totality of 
the circumstances," the district court had properly assessed the lawfulness of the 
multimember district, "overlaid, as it was, on the cultural and economic realities
of the plaintiff class.  White, 412 U.S. at 769 (emphasis added).  Those realities, 
of course, predated and existed independently of the recent reapportionment.  For 
the White Court, that did not matter. For the majority, nothing else would.  Thus, 
in codifying and relying on White when it amended the Voting Rights Act, Congress 
could not have shared the majority's understanding of the kind of causation §
requires. 
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Bois, The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study 373-75 (1899).  Gunnar Myrdal, in a work on 
which the Supreme Court has relied in defining equal justice under law, has also noted 
"the striking relationship between nonvoting and poverty."  Gunnar Myrdal, An American 
Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, 493 (1944) (cited in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954)).  But we should not have to depend on landmark 
works of social science to understand this point.  We need only follow Congress's 
instruction that in assessing the way a voting law affects individuals' opportunities to 
participate in political processes, we conduct an evaluation of past and present reality.
Councilman Ortiz described that reality at trial, where he testified that in 
Philadelphia's Latino community: 
[Y]ou have a population that is surviving from day to day[,] and to 
try to bring the concept of voting into their world, into their vista, 
is difficult.  [T]hey have a survival mode.  They have to be able to 
put some food on the table for the next day. And we've had 
difficulties trying to convince folks that the political system is 
going to make a difference in their lives, that by participating in 
the process, they're going to effect a change. 
A. at 127 (repetitive speech omitted).  Black and Latino residents of Philadelphia, who, 
as the district court found, have suffered discrimination and disadvantage in every 
socioeconomic category, have fewer resources to devote to the tasks of registration and 
voting.  Moreover, their experience has often taught them that such efforts will not 
improve their lives. Frustration and alienation can lead to apathy, which decreases 
participation, which further erodes the political power of minority groups.  Judge Wisdom 
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 The evaluation need not be particularly searching.  As the district court put it, 
"In fact, in evaluating a challenge to an election procedure pursuant to § 2, it 
would be myopic for a court to overlook the impact that [socio-economic] factors may 
have on minority voter turnout." Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 525.  Under the majority's 
construction of § 2, however, courts have no need for even limited vision of the 
underlying causes which contribute to a challenged law's effect. 
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described this cycle of discrimination, disadvantage, and disenfranchisement in United 
States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1567 (11th Cir. 1984), where he noted that 
"[p]ast discrimination may cause blacks to register or vote in lower numbers than whites 
[and] may also lead to present socioeconomic disadvantages, which in turn can reduce 
participation and influence in political affairs."  A law that purges registrants for 
failing to vote can only contribute to the symbiotic causes and effects of socioeconomic 
and political inequality.  Thus, for Latinos and blacks, having their registration 
nullified only confirms what they are more likely to already believe: that given the 
higher costs and lower benefits of participating in the political process, there is simply 
no point in making the effort.   
 Even if we could not achieve our own understanding of this reality, its truth is 
plain enough that Congress and the Supreme Court have told us to take it on faith.  Again, 
citing White, the Senate Report states that where plaintiffs can show socioeconomic 
disadvantage and discrimination along with depressed rates of political participation, 
they need not prove any further causal nexus between these facts.  Sen. Rep. at 29 n.114.  
Of course, if the majority is right, the existence of such a causal nexus would defeat any 
challenge to a law that had a disparate impact on those who voted less often.  The 
majority, once again, would require the plaintiffs here to have proven that the purge law 
itself caused minority voters to be removed from the registration rolls at 
disproportionately high rates.  Factors like poverty, lack of education, and inability to 
find work or housing as a result of discrimination, it states, are simply not relevant.  
Maj. Op. Typescript at 25.  However, we know that while the non-voting purge law may play 
some part in further discouraging black and Latino political participation, it is largely 
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societal discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantage, of the sort the district court 
found, that operate to depress minority turnout rates.  If discrimination and disadvantage 
cause blacks and Latinos to vote less often, which we discover by consulting either the 
record or reality, then the purge law itself cannot be responsible for removing so many 
more members of these groups from the registration rolls.  That is undeniable. The 
plaintiffs do not and cannot argue otherwise.  So, if the majority is right, Congress and 
the Supreme Court -- by relieving plaintiffs of the need to prove a causal connection 
between discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantage, on the one hand, and lower 
participation rates, on the other -- have effectively immunized non-voting purge laws from 
§ 2 challenges.  Such laws cannot be responsible for the disparate impact they have when, 
as a matter of law, discrimination and disadvantage are at least principally to blame.  
Clearly, though, Congress and the Court have done no such thing, and the majority has 
erred in its construction of § 2. 
 The district and appellate court decisions in Mississippi State Chapter, 
Operation PUSH v. Allain  674 F. Supp. 1245, 1263-68 (N.D. Miss. 1987) ("Operation PUSH 
I"), aff'd sub nom. Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH, Inc. v. Mabus ("Operation 
PUSH III"), 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991), a case which closely parallels this one, 
properly apply § 2 and reject the majority's position.  In Operation PUSH, the plaintiffs 
challenged two Mississippi registration laws: one, the State's "dual registration 
process," required citizens to register first with a county registrar in order to vote in 
federal, state, and county elections, and again with a municipal clerk in order to vote in 
municipal elections; the other, the State's prohibition of "satellite registration," 
severely limited the extent to which citizens could register at places other than the 
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registrar's office.  Operation PUSH III, 932 F.2d at 402.  The district court found that 
these procedures had a substantial disparate impact on black registration rates.  That 
disparity, it concluded, resulted in minority members of the electorate having less of an 
opportunity to participate in the political process and thus established a violation of 
§ 2.  Operation PUSH I, 674 F. Supp. at 1268.  Of course, Mississippi's registration laws 
had not themselves caused the failure of blacks to register as often as whites.  The 
inequality occurred, as the court of appeals put it, "[b]ecause a significant percentage 
of Mississippi's black citizens do not have (1) access to the transportation necessary to 
travel to the county courthouse to register or (2) the type of jobs that would allow them 
to leave work during business hours to register to vote . . . ."  Operation PUSH III
F.2d at 403; see also Operation PUSH I, 674 F. Supp. at 1255-56.0  Those circumstances 
interacted with the challenged law to create a disparity in registration rates, which gave 
rise to a § 2 violation.  Operation PUSH I, 674 F. Supp. at 1255-56, 1268.  In affirming 
that ruling, the Eleventh Circuit did not express any doubt as to the soundness of the 
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 The district court found that the registration laws had "a disparate impact on the 
opportunities of black citizens in Mississippi to register to vote because of their 
socio-economic and occupational status."  Operation PUSH I, 674 F. Supp. at 1255.  
In particular, the court focused on three significant forms of socioeconomic 
disadvantage: (1) "that black workers in Mississippi predominate in blue-collar and 
service worker positions in which they are likely to be working for an hourly wage 
and are less likely to be able to take off from work to register to vote during the 
regular office hours . . . [;]" (2) that "black citizens are also much less able 
than whites to travel to the county courthouse, or other centralized voter 
registration locations" because black households were much less likely to have a 
vehicle available; and (3) that "a disproportionately high percentage of black 
households do not have a telephone available for household use," which made it more 
difficult for blacks to obtain information about procedures for registering.  
1253, 1256. Because of these disadvantages, the district court concluded, blacks 
experienced greater difficulty in overcoming the administrative barriers to 
registering that Mississippi had created through its challenged laws.  Id. at 1256.
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district court's reasoning.  The only question, in its view, was whether the court had 
erred in finding that blacks had registered in significantly lower numbers.  Operation 
PUSH III, 932 F.2d at 409-13.  Given the evidentiary support for the trial judge's 
determination that such a disparity did exist, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the decision 
that the challenged laws, and the effect they had, violated § 2. 
 Unlike the majority, the Operation PUSH courts did not merely note that blacks 
registered less often, and that the registration laws themselves were not responsible for 
the disparity.  Instead, the courts looked to the way in which the challenged laws 
interacted with social and historical conditions, such as the class members' occupational 
status and limited access to transportation and information, to result in a lack of equal 
opportunity for the plaintiffs to participate in the political process.  The obvious fact 
that the causes of those conditions had little or nothing to do with the challenged 
registration laws was legally irrelevant to the Operation PUSH courts, which clearly did 
not share the majority's understanding of § 2.0 
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 The majority's attempt to distinguish the Operation PUSH cases is unpersuasive.  It 
states that in Operation PUSH, unlike this case, the challenged voting laws were 
"the causes of black voters' registering at lower rates than white voters."  Maj. 
Op. Typescript at 24 n.17 (emphasis added).  The Operation PUSH courts, however, 
clearly did not find, and did not require the plaintiffs to show, that Mississippi's 
registration procedures were "the causes" of the statistical disparity in 
registration rates.  There was no established causal "link" -- as the majority puts 
it elsewhere -- between the challenged laws, on the one hand, and either the types 
of jobs black residents held, or the facts that they possessed fewer cars and 
telephones, on the other.  Rather, those conditions interacted with the registration 
procedures to produce a discriminatory result, and that constituted a violation of 
§ 2.   
 
The majority's treatment of Operation PUSH also suggests that it sees a meaningful 
difference between laws that make registration more difficult to begin with, on the 
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 United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984), is 
similar, in significant respects, to Operation PUSH, and also rejects the majority's view 
of the kind of causation a plaintiff must show in order to prevail on a § 2 claim.  In 
Marengo County, black plaintiffs challenged laws that provided for the at-large election 
of members of the County Commission and the school board.  The district court, in 
dismissing the case, had "attributed the absence of elected black officials to `voter 
apathy' and `a failure of blacks to turn out their votes.'"  Marengo County, 731 F.2d at 
1568 (quoting the district court opinion).  The Eleventh Circuit rejected the district 
court's findings as clearly erroneous and reversed. 
 In reaching its decision, the Marengo County court relied, in part, on the 
plaintiffs' showings that (1) the County Board of Registrars was open infrequently an
never visited outlying areas to register rural voters, and (2) the County had not 
permitted a black person to serve as a deputy registrar.  Id. at 1570.  The district court 
had stated that it did not see how such policies discriminated against blacks.  The court 
of appeals responded: 
 These policies, however, unquestionably discriminated against 
blacks because fewer blacks were registered. . . .  By holding short 
hours the Board made it harder for unregistered voters, more of whom 
are black than white, to register.  By meeting only in Linden the 
Board was less accessible to eligible rural voters, who were more 
black than white.  By having few black poll officials and spurning the 
voluntary offer of a black citizen to serve as a registrar, county 
officials impaired black access to the political system and the 
confidence of blacks in the system's openness. 
 
                                                                                          
one hand, and laws that make it more difficult for someone to stay registered, on 
the other.  In my view, that is not a reasonable distinction. 
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Marengo County, 731 F.2d at 1570 (footnote and citation omitted). Like the Operation PUSH
courts, the Eleventh Circuit did not require the plaintiffs to prove that the measures 
they challenged were responsible for their failure to register or vote.  In fact, in 
rejecting the district court's finding that blacks had simply failed to overcome their 
apathy, the court explained that a variety of social and historical circumstances 
accounted for the fact that blacks participated in significantly lower numbers than 
whites.  Id. at 1568, 1574.  Those proven circumstances, in conjunction with the 
challenged voting practices, had a discriminatory effect on blacks.  For that reason, the 
court concluded, the record compelled a finding that the County's at-large election system 
violated § 2.  Id. at 1574.0 
 The majority relies on Salas v. Southwest Texas Junior College Dist., 964 F.2d 
1542 (5th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that "a protected class is not entitled to §
relief merely because it turns out in a lower percentage than whites to vote." Maj. Op. 
Typescript at 21.  The context of that statement, however, reveals that Salas provides no 
support for the majority's holding.  In Salas, Hispanic voters, who constituted a majority 
of the registered voters in an at-large district, challenged the use of the at-large 
                     
0
 Other cases that do not share the majority's view of § 2 include: Harris v. 
Graddick, 593 F. Supp. 128 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (awarding an injunction to black 
citizens who claimed that a state's failure to appoint greater numbers of black poll 
officials violated § 2), and sub nom., Harris v. Siegelman, 695 F. Supp. 517 
Ala. 1988) (holding that plaintiffs established violations of § 2, based on the 
conclusion that social and historical circumstances interacted with the challenged 
law, as well as with the disproportionately low number of black polling officials, 
to discourage black political participation); and Brown v. Dean, 555 F. Supp. 502 
(D.R.I. 1982) (enjoining a city's use of a polling facility based on a finding that 
the facility's location would be a substantial deterrent to voting by a class of 
black residents). 
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system (as opposed to single-member districts) under § 2.  The court held that the 
plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the third element of the threshold test for vote dilution 
claims that the Supreme Court adopted in Thornburg v. Gingles, because they had not 
demonstrated that white bloc voting usually prevented Hispanics from electing their 
preferred representatives.  Salas, 964 F.2d at 1555.  The Fifth Circuit reasoned that even 
though the plaintiffs were members of a class that included a majority of the registered 
voters in the challenged district, they might nonetheless, in some instances, have been 
able to show that minority bloc voting frustrated their chances of electoral success.  
For example, if such plaintiffs could establish that they faced "practical impediments to 
voting" or that "low turnout at elections was the result of prior official 
discrimination," they could prove that their registered majority did not allow the class 
to overcome opposition from a cohesive minority of whites.  Id. at 1555-56. In such 
circumstances, which the plaintiffs in Salas had failed to prove, an at-large district 
would be subject to a § 2 challenge brought by members of a majority class.  But the 
plaintiffs had not accounted, in any way, for their inability to take advantage of their 
majority status.  In that context, we can understand the court's statement that "a 
protected class is not entitled to § 2 relief merely because it turns out in a lower 
percentage than whites to vote."  Salas, 964 F.2d at 1556. 
 Here, the plaintiffs are not members of a majority class confronting the 
difficult task of satisfying the Gingles preconditions.  The questions this case presents, 
and the factors that we must take into account in providing answers, are somewhat 
different.  Nonetheless, to the extent that Salas does provide guidance, the decision 
actually rejects the majority's reading of the Voting Rights Act.  According to the Fifth 
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Circuit, the plaintiffs in Salas could have prevailed if they had shown the existence of 
"practical impediments to voting" or low turnout rates resulting from prior discrimination 
(as may have occurred here, according to the district court).  Those circumstances, the 
court reasoned, could interact with the state's districting plan in such a way as to 
deprive class members of an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and 
to elect their chosen representatives.  Under the majority's construction of § 2, however, 
the Salas plaintiffs would have needed to prove that the voting measure they challenged, 
an at-large district, actually caused the practical impediments to voting or the low 
turnout rates that compromised their chances for success.  Of course, that is an 
impossible requirement.  District lines, like purge laws, cannot by themselves cause the 
"totality of the circumstances" that courts are supposed to consider in applying § 
Fifth Circuit would not have required the Salas plaintiffs to make such a showing.  The 
majority here, in contrast, holds that because Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law is not 
itself the cause of blacks' and Latinos' failure to vote more often, the plaintiffs have 
not established a violation of § 2.  Salas does not take that view, and neither do I.
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 In addition to Salas, the majority relies on Irby v. Virginia State Board of 
Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989).  It is difficult to overstate the 
differences between Irby and the case before us.  In Irby, a group of individual 
black plaintiffs and two civil rights organizations challenged a law that provided 
for the appointment, rather than the election, of school board members.  First, 
assuming appointive systems are subject to challenge under § 2 -- a proposition 
about which the Fourth Circuit expressed "considerable doubt", Irby, 889 F.2d at 
1357 -- the legal and factual variables involved in such a case, where no voting and 
no electing has ever occurred, could not be comparable to those involved here (or 
elsewhere).  Second, in Irby, the plaintiffs had failed to show any causal 
connection between the selection system they challenged and the underrepresentation 
of blacks on school boards; for example, the court pointed out, in one of the two 
counties where a statistically significant disparity did exist, every black resident 
who had requested appointment to the school board since 1971 had been selected as a 
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 In amending § 2, Congress devoted most of its attention to vote dilution cases.  
White v. Register, for example, the case from which Congress drew the legal standard for 
defining a violation of § 2, involved a challenge to state reapportionment plans.  And 
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), which articulated and enumerated the 
factors that the Court had taken into consideration in White, addressed the legality of 
multi-member districts.  The Senate Report's now-familiar list of "typical" (but not 
exclusive or required) factors that plaintiffs can show in establishing a violation of §
is drawn directly from Zimmer.  See Sen. Rep. at 29.  Congress made clear, however, that 
while it had focused and relied mainly on vote dilution cases in amending § 2 and 
explaining the new provision's meaning, § 2 would continue to prohibit "all voting rights 
discrimination," including "episodic" practices which did not involve the "permanent 
structural barriers" to political equality seen in the vote dilution context. Sen. Rep. at 
30.  The Report explains: 
 If the challenged practice relates to such a series of events or 
episodes, the proof sufficient to establish a violation would not 
necessarily involve the same factors as the courts have utilized when 
dealing with permanent structural barriers. Of course, the ultimate 
test would be the White standard codified by this amendment of Section 
2: whether, in the particular situation, the practice operated to deny 
                                                                                          
member.  Id. at 1358.  In light of those facts, the Fourth Circuit concluded that 
the appointive system did not produce a disparate effect.  Id. at 1359. The Irby
court had no occasion even to consider a causation requirement such as the one the 
majority adopts here, because the challenged practice played no part in bringing 
about the lower number of blacks on the two school boards.  Such a situation is not 
at all similar to one in which a purge law directly removes disproportionately high 
numbers of minority citizens from the registration rolls. 
 
At the very most, Irby provides incremental support for the position that § 2 
plaintiffs must show some causal connection between a challenged voting practice and 
the disparity at issue.  As I have stated, that is not a controversial point, and 
neither the plaintiffs nor I suggest otherwise. 
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the minority plaintiff an equal opportunity to participate and to 
elect candidates of their choice. 
Id.  Thus, events or episodes occurring during the administration of elections that 
resulted in unequal political opportunity would remain unlawful, although the factors 
relevant to proving such discriminatory effects might well be different from those 
involved in vote dilution cases. 
 In a footnote to the statement quoted above, Congress mentions purging as one 
variety of the "episodic discrimination" that § 2 would continue to prohibit.0  The note 
states: "[P]urging of voters could produce a discriminatory result if fair procedures were 
not followed, Toney v. White, 488 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1973), or if the need for a purge 
were not shown or if opportunities for re-registration were unduly limited."  Sen. Rep. at 
30 n.119 (emphasis added).0  For two reasons, this statement does not support an 
affirmance here.  First, as I discuss at greater length below, the City did not prove "the 
need" for Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law.  The district court found that the law 
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 While purging could be conducted "episodically" -- that is, on discrete occasions or 
in a related series of events -- I would not describe the annual operation of 
Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law as "episodic."  It is not "structural" in the 
same way as a redistricting plan; nor is it temporary, however, and the law produces 
its discriminatory effects in a reliable and consistent manner from year to year.  
Therefore, I will not refer to the kind of purging that occurred in this case as an 
"episodic" voting practice. 
0
 By making clear that purging can violate § 2, the Senate Report creates a potential 
problem for the majority's argument that these laws, because they only affect 
individuals who have registered and voted, must be permissible.  The majority deals 
with this problem by emphasizing that in each example of unlawful purging the Senate 
Report mentions, it is the statute "itself" that produces a discriminatory result.  
Putting aside, for the moment, my more important disagreements with the majority's 
reading of § 2's legislative history, and with its theory of causation, the fact 
remains that even a purge law that itself produces unlawful results can only affect 
voters who have already registered.  This troublesome point, however, is only a 
minor symptom of the infirmity afflicting the majority's argument. 
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served the legitimate purpose of preventing fraud, but laws are not necessary merely 
because they serve a valid purpose.  Second, Congress mentioned purging as an example of 
the "episodic discrimination" that would remain within the scope of § 2, and the types of 
purges it listed in the one sentence it devoted to the subject are merely more specific 
examples of the way in which purging can have a "discriminatory result."  Congress 
provided no indication that purging could not produce discriminatory results, and thus 
violate § 2, in other ways.  Indeed, such a suggestion would run directly counter to the 
flexible approach to § 2 cases that Congress intended courts to follow in situations 
involving different factual and legal variables.0  
 In the majority's view, however, the Senate Report's brief and illustrative 
reference to purging contains an "implicit" recognition "that a purge statute which was 
administered fairly, and in an even-handed manner, would not run afoul of the law."  Maj. 
Op. Typescript at 14 n.6.  I have no idea where the majority finds such an implication.  
The text of the footnote plainly does not support it.  See Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 522 
(recognizing that the list in the footnote merely "provides several examples of how 
purging voters could violate § 2," and that it does not "establish any prerequisites that 
plaintiffs . . . must establish in order to state a cognizable claim under the Act"); 
also, Steve Barber et al., Comment, The Purging of Empowerment: Voter Purge Laws and the 
Voting Rights Act, 23 Harv. C.R-C.L. L. Rev. 483, 520 (1988) (stating that as the footnote 
makes clear, the types of purges it lists "are merely examples of situations that might 
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 As the district court accurately stated, the legislative history expresses "the 
importance of applying a flexible approach when evaluating § 2 challenges, rather 
than a `mechanical' pointcounting analysis."  Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 524; see also
Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1125, 1129 (recognizing the need to maintain a flexible approach 
in order to promote the goals and underlying principles of the Voting Rights Act).
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produce a discriminatory result, rather than an exhaustive list of the only ways in which 
purges could violate Section 2").  Moreover, Congress expressly disavowed the kind of 
purpose the majority believes it implied, stating: "[E]ven a consistently applied practice 
premised on a racially neutral policy would not negate a plaintiff's showing through other 
factors that the challenged practice denies minorities fair access to the process."  Sen. 
Rep. at 29 n.117.  Finally, under the majority's perception of what Congress implicitly 
recognized, not even all the examples included in the Report's brief reference to purging 
would constitute violations of § 2.  An unnecessary purge law that "unduly limited" 
opportunities for re-registration, for instance, would not, in the majority's view, run 
afoul of the Voting Rights Act so long as the law was administered fairly.  Congress's 
statements, which express a different view, do not dissuade the majority from relying upon 
an unsupported implication that would severely, and I believe improperly, limit the scope 
of § 2 in challenges to the purging of registered voters. 
 The Senate Report acknowledges that especially outside the context of vote 
dilution claims, the factors that courts should consider in determining whether a 
challenged voting practice violates § 2 may well be different than those appearing in the 
list of "typical" factors drawn from White and Zimmer. The Report does not, however, 
provide any guidance with respect to what factors courts should consider in the type of 
case we confront here.  The majority makes no effort to identify or explore the 
considerations that figure into an evaluation of the effect and legality of a non-voting 
purge law, probably because, in light of its theory of causation, it sees no need to do 
so. The district court, in contrast, addressed this important question, see Ortiz, 824 F. 
Supp. at 523-24, and I agree with some of its conclusions.  As the district court 
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recognized, the factors making up the threshold test for vote dilution claims that the 
Supreme Court adopted in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 49-51, have little place in a 
§ 2 challenge to a purge law. Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 523 (describing the Gingles 
preconditions as "peripheral issues bearing limited relevance to the plaintiffs' claim"); 
see also Operation PUSH I, 674 F. Supp. at 1264 (concluding that the occurrence of 
polarized voting is not germane to a § 2 challenge to registration procedures); cf. 
v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 350 (E.D. La. 1983) (three-judge court) ("To the extent that 
the enumerated factors are not factually relevant, they may be replaced or substituted by 
other, more meaningful factors.").  The size, geographic insularity, and political 
cohesion of minority or majority groups are all irrelevant to the question of whether a 
non-voting purge statute has a discriminatory effect.  Such a law operates to nullify the 
registration of individuals who fail to vote or reinstate themselves.  Therefore, the 
important factors are those that influence peoples' willingness and ability to participate 
or seek reinstatement.  As discussed, the existence of discrimination and socioeconomic 
disadvantage is of primary importance among those factors.0  Other significant 
considerations could include: a history of official discrimination in voting, efforts made 
with the design or effect of limiting the political power of minority groups, the 
difficulty minority constituents have experienced in trying to elect their preferred 
candidates, and a lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the 
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 Contrary to the majority's assertion, I have not stated, nor do I believe, that 
societal conditions such as discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantage 
"constitute" the totality of the circumstances that a court should consider in 
evaluating the legality of a non-voting purge statute.  Rather, those factors are 
particularly significant circumstances, among others, which contribute to the 
totality.  Additionally, as should be clear, I do not mean for the list of relevant 
factors I mention here to be exhaustive. 
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particular needs and concerns of minority communities.  Each of those factors could 
further discourage participation and therefore, each could interact with a non-voting 
purge statute to cause an unlawful abridgement of a group's opportunity to participate in 
the political process and to elect its chosen representatives.0 
 Given the majority's erroneous construction of § 2, however, this task of 
identifying and weighing relevant factors is of secondary importance.  The critical point, 
it bears repeating, is that contrary to the majority's view, whatever the relevant factors 
are, they need not be products of, or causally linked to, a challenged voting law in order 
to merit consideration in a court's determination of the law's effect and legality.  It is 
a law's interaction with the totality of the circumstances, and not its creation of
circumstances, that § 2 requires us to evaluate.  
B. 
 The plaintiffs have argued that in order to prove that Pennsylvania's non
purge law violates § 2, they must, in addition to showing the law's disparate impact on 
blacks and Latinos, demonstrate that the State could achieve its legitimate goal of 
preventing election fraud in a less discriminatory way. As noted above, the Senate Report 
provides some support for that position by stating that if the "need for a purge" is not 
shown, the practice could constitute an instance of prohibited "episodic discrimination."  
Sen. Rep. at 30 n.119.  Here, the plaintiffs want to take on the burden of proving that 
Pennsylvania does not need a purge law that results in the disenfranchisement of 
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 The existence of racial appeals, in contrast, could conceivably increase minority 
turnout and thus work against any discriminatory effect that a non-voting purge 
might have.  I imagine that this factor could point either way, depending on the 
nature of the evidence presented in a particular case. 
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disproportionately high numbers of Latinos and blacks.  Moreover, they have asked us to 
find that they carried that burden at trial. 
 I agree with much, though not all, of the plaintiffs' argument.  In enacting and 
amending § 2, Congress did not intend to mandate equal political opportunity at the 
expense of state and local governments' abilities to pursue legitimate goals such as the 
prevention of voting fraud.  Where measures are in fact necessary to achieve such 
objectives, Congress would have surely meant for them to remain in effect.  There is no 
point in guaranteeing equal access to corrupt political processes that have no democrat
value.  To the contrary, the Voting Rights Act is premised on the existence of free and 
fair elections that reflect popular will with accuracy and integrity, and it should not be 
interpreted to prevent such elections from occurring.0 However, a voting practice that 
compromises equality, as I believe Pennsylvania's purge statute does, should only be 
permitted if it is in fact necessary to achieve or preserve this type of public interest.
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 I share the majority's concern about Philadelphia's need to guard against fraudulent 
voting practices in administering its elections.  The dispute arising out of the 
State Senate race between Bruce Marks and William Stinson provides a recent reminder 
of the seriousness of this problem.  See Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 
1994).  Of course, as we all recognize, the City is no Newcomer to dishonest 
election tactics.  Nearly 100 years ago, Dr. Du Bois described the widespread 
practice of buying votes in Philadelphia, and stated: "To-day the government of both 
city and State is unparalleled in the history of republican government for brazen 
dishonesty and bare-faced defiance of public opinion."  W.E.B. Du Bois, The 
Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study 372, 376-77 (1899). 
0
 According to the majority, "it is well established that purge statutes are a 
legitimate means by which the State can attempt to prevent voter fraud."  Maj. Op. 
Typescript at 20 & n.13.  By "legitimate," the majority cannot mean permissible 
under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  The published reports do not contain a single 
case, other than this one, that decides a § 2 challenge to a non-voting purge law.  
The only scholarship directly addressing the question argues that such laws are 
likely to violate § 2. Barber, supra p. 34, at 517-527. 
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 Title VII disparate-impact law, in my view, provides a particularly appropriate 
analogy supporting the adoption of such a standard.  In disparate-impact cases, employers 
can justify their use of challenged practices that have a greater negative effect on 
members of a protected class by proving that such practices constitute a "business 
necessity."  See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (first 
articulating the concept of business necessity); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329
32 (1977) (holding that defendant-employer failed to show business necessity, and that 
therefore, plaintiffs properly prevailed in disparate-impact Title VII case); see also
                                                                                          
The cases the majority credits with recognizing the well-established legitimacy of 
non-voting purge statutes all resolve constitutional, not statutory challenges to 
voting laws.  And in fact, of the decisions on which the majority relies, only 
Hoffman v. Maryland, 928 F.2d 646 (4th Cir. 1991), involves a non-voting purge law.  
In Hoffman, the court held that Maryland's five-year non-voting purge did not 
violate the First Amendment because the law was content-neutral, was designed to 
serve the important state interest of curbing vote fraud, and did not unreasonably 
restrict alternative avenues of communication; the court also rejected the 
plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim because they were not, as non-voters, members 
of a suspect class. This case, of course, unlike those the majority mentions, has 
been brought under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which no court has read to permit 
any and all voting laws that serve a valid purpose. 
 
The majority surmises that § 2 challenges to purge laws have not been brought 
because they would necessarily fail. Maj. Op. Typescript at 24-25.  The assumption 
on which that theory rests, of course, is that if an untried claim had any merit, it 
would not be untried.  I do not believe that is so.  In the first of the serie
lectures that would be published as The Nature of the Judicial Process, then-
Cardozo described the judge's search for applicable precedent as an attempt "to 
match the colors of the case at hand against the many sample cases spread out upon 
their desk."  Cardozo likened this process to a simple task of flipping through a 
card index of decisions.  However, he continued, "It is when the colors do not 
match, when the references in the index fail, when there is no decisive precedent, 
that the serious business of the judge begins." Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of 
the Judicial Process 20-21 (1921).  The absence of cases deciding § 2 challenges to 
purge laws only means that the legitimacy of such measures is not well-established, 
and that we have serious business to do here.       
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U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A), (C) (codifying the disparate-impact standards developed in 
and following Griggs, including the business necessity defense, and nullifying Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)).  I would take the same approach here.  Title 
VII disparate-impact law, like § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, adopts a results test for 
ensuring that protected individuals will not suffer a deprivation of the type of equal 
opportunity that the law mandates.  Given the similarities between these two statutes, it 
is not surprising that in Griggs, the Supreme Court relied on a Voting Rights Act case, 
Gaston County, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (discussed infra
53-54 n.30), in first explaining how and why Title VII prohibited the sort of 
discrimination challenged in a disparate-impact suit.0  Griggs's reliance on Gaston County
supports the analogy I am suggesting. 
 If an employer can show that an employment practice that operates to the 
disadvantage of minority workers is necessary to run its business, that practice is 
permissible. Similarly, in my view, if a state or local government can show that a voting 
practice that operates to the disadvantage of minority registrants is necessary to run a 
valid election, that practice would not constitute a violation of § 2.0  While the 
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 Gaston County was brought under § 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973b(a) (currently 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)).  Section 4(a) was -- and following 
its amendment, still is -- similar to § 2, aside from its placement of the burden of 
proof.  It provides that a state or subdivision, in order to reinstate a suspended 
voting practice, must show that the practice has not been used "for the purpose or 
with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color."   
0
 The majority relies on Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986), which 
involved a § 2 challenge to a law disenfranchising convicted felons.  As the 
majority notes, in concluding that the law did not violate the Voting Rights Ac
the Wesley court emphasized "the state's legitimate and compelling rationale for 
enacting the statute here in issue."  Id. at 1261.  Wesley is based, to a 
significant extent, on legal principles that justifiably limit the civil rights of 
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plaintiffs here have volunteered to prove that Pennsylvania does not need its non-voting 
purge law to guard against fraud, I would not require them to do so.  Consistent with 
other results-based anti-discrimination law, defendants should bear the burden of proving 
necessity once plaintiffs establish the existence of a disparate impact. 
 The plaintiffs argue that the uncontroverted evidence they introduced at trial 
"indisputably establishes that there are reasonable, less discriminatory alternatives to 
Philadelphia's non-voting purge."  Appellants' Brief at 32.  I disagree. Evidence does not 
become indisputable merely because it is never disputed.  Some evidence fails on its own, 
without any help from opposing evidence.  Trial judges are not obligated to credit 
uncontroverted testimony; they can simply remain unpersuaded.  In this case, the district 
court never considered whether the City needed a non-voting purge law to prevent electoral 
fraud because the legal standard it adopted did not include this element.  The court found 
that the policy reasons for the law were "not tenuous," and that the law in fact served 
its intended purpose. "Not tenuous," however, is a long way from necessary.  The 
plaintiffs' evidence would have easily supported a finding that practical, effective, less 
discriminatory alternatives to the purge do exist, but it did not "indisputably establish" 
anything. As a court of appeals, we are in no position to resolve this question.  
Therefore, under my view of § 2 and the evidence presented, a remand would be appropriate.
                                                                                          
convicted felons.  Id. at 1261-62.  In that context, a court could readily conclude 
that a statute disenfranchising felons was necessary to serve the state's compelling 
penalogical interests.  It is doubtful that the objective of restricting offenders' 
rights to participate in civil society could be met in a different way.  In any 
event, because the plaintiffs here have not lost their rights by committing crimes, 
Wesley is distinguishable. 
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 The majority, however, without the assistance of the district court, and without 
evidentiary support, now finds that the non-voting purge law actually is "needed" to 
prevent electoral fraud.  Maj. Op. Typescript at 26 (relying on "a review of the record 
and present reality").  That is an unfounded conclusion.  Again, I do not dispute that the 
purge law serves a valid purpose; I accept the district court's finding that the law is 
useful in preventing fraud.  But neither the anecdotal incidents the majority mentions nor 
the record show anything more.  Contrary to the majority's apparent view, usefulness and 
necessity are two entirely different things.  In order to find that the purge law is 
needed, as the majority now does, a court must first consider whether equally effective 
but less discriminatory alternatives exist, which neither the district court nor the 
majority has ever done. 
 The testimony of Emmett Fremaux, Jr., whom the district court qualified as an 
expert on election and voter registration procedures, provides the only evidence in the 
record on the subject of alternatives to the non-voting purge law.  Fremaux testified that 
the law's important purposes could be achieved more effectively through other mechanisms 
which, unlike purge laws, would not have a pronounced discriminatory effect.  A. at 311, 
316.  He based his opinion, to a significant extent, on his experience in administering 
registration and election procedures in Washington, D.C., which had successfully replaced 
its non-voting purge law with a "mail canvass" system.  In addition, Fremaux stated, othe
large cities run clean elections without relying on non-voting purges.  A. at 331.  
 Through this testimony, the plaintiffs introduced uncontroverted evidence that 
more effective, less discriminatory alternatives to a non-voting purge law do exist.  
Moreover, the City has not suggested that come January, 1995, when the National Voter 
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Registration Act becomes effective and puts an end to the non-voting purge (at least in 
elections for federal office),0 alarming numbers of voters will emerge from prior 
residences or the grave to defile the integrity of Philadelphia elections.  In a matter of 
months, purging will cease.  Elections, presumably, will not.  At oral argument, the City 
stated that it had every intention of complying with the new law.  Apparently, 
Philadelphia believes that starting next year, it will somehow manage without the purge 
statute that the majority finds it needs this year.0   
 The district court may not have been persuaded by the evidence that viable, less 
discriminatory alternatives to purging do exist.  That, again, is its prerogative.  
Moreover, before considering the question on remand, the court might properly exercise its 
discretion to allow the parties to present additional evidence on this issue.  The City 
did not do so at trial, no doubt, because it did not (and still does not) believe the 
question was legally relevant.   
                     
0
 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973gg-6(b).  I discuss this legislation at greater length belo
infra pp. 54-57, 74 & n.40. 
0
 I do not mean to suggest that the impending effectiveness of the National Voter 
Registration Act constitutes conclusive proof that the purge statute is not 
necessary. The City might be able to demonstrate that compliance will require 
financial, administrative, or informational resources that it does not presently 
possess.  The district court could properly consider such an argument on remand.
 
The impending unlawfulness of purging also does not constitute a reason to take th
case any less seriously. First, elections will be held later this year, and as the 
majority points out, the City has already begun to purge. Citizens whose 
registration is nullified will not be able to vote, and they will not be 
automatically reinstated when the practice becomes prohibited.  Second, this 
decision, like the discriminatory effects of the purge statute, is likely to outlive 
the statute itself.  The cessation of purging will not cure the majority's erroneous 
construction of § 2.   
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 While I do not accept the plaintiffs' argument that they have "indisputably 
established" the existence of effective, less discriminatory alternatives to the st
they challenge, they can at least point to substantial, even uncontroverted evidence in 
support of that position.  The majority cannot make nearly as strong a case for its 
unassisted finding that Philadelphia does need the non-voting purge law to prevent 
electoral fraud.  Unlike the majority, I do not believe that we are in any position to 
decide this question.  Thus, while the purge statute may or may not be necessary, a remand 
certainly is.    C. 
 To summarize, largely as a result of social and historical conditions reflected 
in the district court's findings, black and Latino Philadelphians vote less often.  
Because they vote less often, Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law operates to remove 
members of these protected classes from the registration rolls at disproportionately 
higher rates.  The purge law, as the majority emphasizes, is not the sole or primary cause 
of the circumstances with which it interacts to limit the opportunity of blacks and 
Latinos to vote in Philadelphia.  In my view, however, neither § 2 nor the decisions 
construing it require the plaintiffs to make such an implausible showing, and the majority 
has erred in concluding otherwise.  Finally, given the demonstrated disparate impact of 
the non-voting purge law, and the way in which it interacts with social and historical 
conditions to deprive members of protected classes of an equal opportunity to participate 
in the political process, I would require the City to establish that the law is necessary 
to prevent voting fraud.  That is a question that should be left, in the first instance, 
to the district court. 
III. 
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 Both the district court and the majority place some importance on the ability of 
black and Latino voters to reinstate themselves after being slated for purging, or to re
register once purged.  Neither opinion clearly spells out the legal significance of the 
possibility of reinstatement or re-registration.  The district court stated its ultimate 
conclusion as follows: "Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the purge law in
with social and historical conditions to deny minority voters equal access to the 
political process and to elect their preferred representatives, particularly since it is 
undisputed that the purge procedure is administered fairly and that there is ample 
opportunity for purged voters to re-register to vote."  Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 539.
court further stated that "[v]oters in jeopardy of being purged who are interested in 
preserving their right to participate in the political process need only vote or request 
reinstatement to preserve that right."  Id.  The majority takes a similar position; in its 
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 This statement reveals that the district court based its conclusion, at least in 
part, on its view of the plaintiffs' opportunity to re-register.  However, the court 
did not make any factual findings on this subject; we do not know how many purged 
voters re-registered, or how many of those who did so are black or Latino.  
Consequently, while the opportunity to re-register undeniably exists in a purely 
formal sense, we do not have even the roughest measure of its practical effect.  The 
district court also did not explain why the possibility of re-registration was 
legally significant.  If for no other reason -- and there are other reasons --
lack of factual and analytical precision, in what is otherwise an admirably thorough 
and conscientious opinion, should necessitate a remand.  In Jenkins, we stated that 
"[b]ecause the complexity of the proof and the importance of the issues involved, 
the district courts must be particularly thorough in explaining their findings on 
both the ultimate issue of vote dilution and on their subsidiary findings as well."  
Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1135 n.35.  Section 2 cases that do not involve vote dilution 
claims raise similarly complex and important issues and thus merit the same 
thoroughness.  The district court, which decided Ortiz before we issued Jenkins
should be given a chance to comply with this instruction.  The remainder of its 
opinion demonstrates that even without our guidance, the court recognized the 
propriety of devoting special efforts to this type of decision.   
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view, disproportionate numbers of Latinos and blacks are purged "because they do not vote, 
and they do not take the opportunity of voting in the next election or requesting 
reinstatement."  Maj. Op. Typescript at 20-21. 
 As I explain above, the district court's conclusion that the non-voting purge 
law does not interact with social and historical conditions to deny blacks and Latinos 
equal access to the political process is irreconcilable with the factual findings on which 
it bases its decision.  Thus, in my view, that conclusion is erroneous.0  Moreover, the 
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 Because the majority is in complete agreement with the district court's legal 
reasoning, it treats the court's ultimate conclusion that no § 2 violation occurred 
here as a purely factual one that we review only for clear error. Maj. Op. 
Typescript at 16 & n.8.  It is worth noting, however, that there is a substantial 
legal component to § 2 decisions, and that therefore, our standard of review in this 
context is not as lenient as the majority opinion might suggest.  Judge Becker, 
writing for the court in Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1103 (3d Cir. 1993), recently provided an 
instructive (and controlling) explanation of the applicable standard of review in 
§ 2 cases.  Discussing the same language in Gingles v. Thornburg on which the 
majority relies for the standard it applies, Jenkins points out that while the 
district court's factual findings are entitled to deference under Rule 52(a)'s clear 
error standard: 
 
"Rule 52(a) `does not inhibit an appellate court's power to correct errors 
of law, including those that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and 
fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the 
governing rule of law.'"  This result is clearly necessary since both the 
ultimate determination of vote dilution and the accompanying subsidiary 
determinations often depend on important legal questions.  Accordingly, we 
must subject the district court's underlying legal analysis to plenary 
review to ensure that the appropriate legal standards are applied.  As the 
[Gingles] Court concluded, it is this combination of factual deference and 
legal review that best "preserves the benefit of the trial court's 
particular familiarity with the indigenous political reality without 
endangering the rule of law." 
 
Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1116-17 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79, in turn quoting 
Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984)).  While the majority may not 
disagree with the more complex standard of review we described in Jenkins, its 
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plaintiffs' ability to reinstate or re-register themselves after being purged does not 
cure the deprivation of equality that unlawfully results from the law's interaction with 
the totality of the circumstances.  A functional view of the political process, informed 
by a searching evaluation of past and present reality, reveals that for members of racia
and language minority groups, neither reinstatement nor re-registration is an 
insignificant barrier to participation. The majority's suggestion to the contrary follows 
from its formalistic understanding of political opportunity and its failure to conside
the reality that Congress instructs us to consult in evaluating the legality of challenged 
voting laws under § 2. 
 Interestingly, the majority contrasts Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law with 
some better-known measures that states and localities have employed with the purpose and 
effect of disenfranchising minority voters.  It points out, for example, that unlike 
"`race-neutral' literacy tests," the purge law is not the type of device "which 
discriminates against minorities, which has no rational basis, and which is beyond the 
control of minority voters."  Maj. Op. Typescript at 19.  But really, what would 
distinguish a § 2 challenge brought against a facially neutral and evenly applied literacy 
test, which had been adopted to further a state's legitimate interest in ensuring 
participation by a minimally informed electorate, from a § 2 challenge such as the one the 
                                                                                          
opinion does not fully convey the significance of the legal component of § 2 
decisions.   
 
I do not take issue with any of the subsidiary factual findings the district court 
made in this case.  In my view, however, as I have stated, those findings cannot be 
reconciled with its ultimate conclusion that no § 2 violation occurred.  My 
disagreement with the district court, therefore, strikes me as more legal than 
factual. In any event, my position does not depend on the applicable standard of 
review. 
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plaintiffs have brought here?0 Surely, members of protected classes can take the 
opportunity to learn to read (English).  Surely, the literacy test itself would not be at 
fault if they failed to do so.  The state would not have prevented such plaintiffs from 
voting.  Rather, under the majority's reasoning, the legally permissible explanation for 
the literacy test's disparate impact would be that minority citizens learn to read at a 
statistically lower rate than white voters. Literacy, after all, like filing a written 
Request for Reinstatement or a voter registration form, is not "beyond the control of 
minority voters."  In fact, reinstatement and re-registration require literacy, along with 
other skills and resources; without the ability to read, an individual will not even know 
that he or she has been slated for purging, let alone be able to respond to such a notice 
by reinstatement or re-registration.  So what makes a well-intentioned, evenly applied, 
and race-neutral literacy test objectionable under § 2, as the majority seems to agree it 
is, while a device like Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law has no trouble passing 
scrutiny?  Why does one measure unlawfully discriminate against minorities, while the 
other does not?  The majority does not suggest an answer to these questions, and I cannot 
imagine one.0 
                     
0
 I am aware that § 201 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, as amended, 
U.S.C. § 1973aa, specifically prohibits the use of literacy tests.  Hypothetically, 
however, such prerequisites to voting could also be challenged under § 2. 
0
 In Gaston County, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), a county 
brought suit under § 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act seeking to reinstate a literacy 
test that it had formerly used as a prerequisite to registration. The Supreme Court 
held that even if the test was administered in a fair and impartial manner, it would 
not be permissible.  Gaston County, 395 U.S. at 296.  In the Court's view, the 
County had failed to disprove that "use of its literacy test, coupled with its 
racially segregated and unequal school system, discriminatorily deprived Negroes of 
the franchise."  Id. at 293.  Of course, as the brief history of segregation and 
educational inequality set forth in the Court's opinion made clear, 395 U.S. at 294
96, the literacy test was not responsible for the fact that a disproportionate 
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 Of the more than 190,000 people who were slated for purging in 1991, all of 
whom, of course, had already taken the trouble to register in the first place, fully 81% 
failed to reinstate themselves.  Reinstatement rates were consistently higher for white 
voters than for blacks and Latinos.  The district court and majority opinions leave the 
possible impression that the 156,000 or so voters who did not object to getting purged had 
just lost interest in political participation. After all, nothing prevented them from 
properly filing a written Request for Reinstatement.  They had the opportunity.  The
simply did not take it.  If these citizens had really wanted to preserve their ability to 
vote, surely they could and would have done so.  As the district court put it, registrants 
who were "interested in preserving their right to participate in the political process 
need[ed] only vote or request reinstatement to preserve that right."  Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. 
at 539.  Mass apathy, particularly among blacks and Latinos, is the only explanation, and 
disinterest is not actionable under the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., Maj. Op. Typescript 
at 21 (relying on Salas for the proposition that members of a protected class are not 
entitled to relief under § 2 merely because they vote less often).  As the City states in 
its brief, the "extra effort" required to reinstate or re-register oneself "is entirely 
the result of the apathy of individual voters."  Appellee's Brief at 42. 
 Viewed formalistically, the task of filing a written Request for Reinstatement 
with the Voter Registration Division of the City Commissioners Office might seem like an 
                                                                                          
percentage of the black residents of Gaston County could not pass such a test.  
There was no evidence of a "link," as the majority might put it, between the 
challenged voting law and the plaintiffs' lack of reading skills.  Nonetheless, 
according to the Court, that social and historical condition, "coupled with" the use 
of even an impartially applied literacy test, resulted in a discriminatory 
disenfranchisement of black citizens and therefore was not permissible under the 
Voting Rights Act. 
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easy thing to do.  From a more practical perspective, however, based on the reinstatement 
statistics and a sense for past and present reality that is not diminished by troubling 
assumptions about the behavior and motivations of black and Latino citizens, we should 
know better.  See Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d at 1568 ("Both Congress and the courts 
have rejected efforts to blame reduced black participation on `apathy'."). 
 The record does not contain statistics showing how many voters re-register after 
being purged, or how many such voters are black or Latino.  We know that as a general 
matter, members of minority groups register in lower percentages than whites.  At trial, 
Sandy Newman, the Executive Director of the plaintiff Project Vote, testified that in his 
organization's efforts to register minority voters, individuals attempting to fill out 
registration forms make errors or omissions in "roughly half the cases."  A. at 93.  
Councilman Ortiz and his aide, Israel Colon, described the special difficulties they 
experienced in efforts to register Latinos, especially as a result of the language 
barrier. A. at 50-51, 129.  According to testimony presented by Robert Lee, the Director 
of the City's Voter Registration Division, his office rejected about 8,800 of the 
registration forms submitted between April and October of 1992; about one out of every 
twenty forms failed to make the grade.  A. at 173.  Apparently, realistically, the task of 
re-registration does, in fact, create a significant obstacle to participation, especially 
for members of minority groups.0 
                     
0
 The majority believes that I have overlooked the fact that individuals cannot be 
purged without having already demonstrated their ability to register.  Maj. Op. 
Typescript at 24.  Registering, it points out, can be no harder the second time 
around than it was the first.  Id. at 21 n.14.  I have not overlooked this point.  
Rather, I believe it is partly unimportant and partly untrue.   
 
48 
 Any doubt that the record leaves regarding the burden of re-registration is 
answered by the recent passage of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, P.L. 103
31, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1973gg et seq. (popularly known as the motor-voter law).  In 
introducing the National Voter Registration Act, Congress stated its finding that 
"discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can have a direct and damaging 
effect on voter participation . . . and disproportionately harm voter participation by 
                                                                                          
As a general matter, doing something twice is more difficult than doing it once.  
Registering to vote is no exception.  Just because some black and Latino citizens 
have overcome obstacles to political participation and registered at some point in 
the past, there is no reason to believe that they will be able to do so again.  And 
even if they continue to have the ability to register (with whatever assistance they 
may have received previously), the task of filing a registration form, in a proper 
and timely manner, remains.  Quite simply, registering twice is harder, and will 
occur less frequently, than registering once. 
 
Moreover, re-registering after being purged is different, and will often be more 
difficult, than registering to begin with, because individuals who register and are 
later purged might not even be aware that they have lost their ability to vote.  
Representative Collins made exactly this point during the motor-voter law debates, 
stating: "[I]f you are busy, as most people are, with the day to day tasks of 
raising a family and working or trying to find a job or whatever else, you might not 
realize that you have missed the last election and have been removed from the voter
registration list until it is too late."  139 Cong. Rec. H517 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
1993) (remarks of Rep. Collins).  Once registered, would-be voters might also 
reasonably believe that the City would not nullify their efforts. Indeed, as the 
authors of the only commentary on purge laws point out, "Purging qualified voters 
who have fulfilled registration requirements will likely increase their frustration 
and humiliation over continued obstacles to the franchise.  Furthermore, it is 
likely to deter voting by increasing alienation and apathy toward the political 
process and by intimidating qualified voters and creating a fear of encounters with 
election officials in the reinstatement process or at the polling place."  Barber, 
supra p. 34, at 523. 
 
For the majority, the fact that purged voters have registered before means that the 
statute could not have violated § 2.  In my view, that fact only further 
demonstrates and contributes to the statute's discriminatory effect. 
49 
various groups, including racial minorities." 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973gg(a)(3).  In light of 
that finding, and with the stated objectives of promoting the exercise of the fundamental 
right to vote, protecting the integrity of the electoral process, and ensuring that 
accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained, Congress enacted a law 
designed to increase registration rates by eliminating, to a significant extent, the need 
for citizens to make independent efforts to register to vote.  See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973gg
(providing for simultaneous driver's license and registration application).  By 
drastically reducing the need for people to complete and submit separate registration 
applications, Congress hoped to "expand[] the rolls of the eligible citizens who are 
registered" and thus "give the greatest number of people the opportunity to participate" 
in federal elections.  H. Rep. No. 103-9, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. 3 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 107.  During the debates, supporters of the bill repeatedly 
expressed the view that practical and procedural obstacles, and not a lack of desire to 
participate, were primarily responsible for the unfortunate fact that roughly 70 million
eligible voters in this country (about 40 percent of the voting-age population) had failed 
to register.  E.g., 139 Cong. Rec. H488 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993) (remarks of Rep. Meek) 
("[T]here are 70 million eligible voters who are not registered because of the burdensome 
registration policies and procedures which we have in this country."); id. at S2470 (daily 
ed. Mar. 5, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Bradley) (stating that 40 percent of the voting-
population cannot vote "because obstacles are placed in the path of them registering to 
vote.")  No legislator ever questioned the fact that the bill would substantially increase 
registration rates.  139 Cong. Rec. H517 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993) (remarks of Rep. Condit) 
(opposing the bill, but acknowledging that it would increase registration).  Common sense 
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and the experience of states that had already adopted motor-voter mechanisms would have 
defeated any such suggestion.  E.g., President's Remarks on Signing the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 914, 915 (May 20, 1993) ("The State 
of Washington instituted a similar measure during the 1992 election, and their motor voter 
program registered in that state alone an additional 186,000 people."); 139 Cong. Rec. 
H495 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993) (remarks of Rep. Tucker) (noting experience of states); 
at S2390 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Ford) (same). 
 Once again, in assessing the effect and legality of a challenged voting law, we 
are supposed to maintain a practical and realistic perspective.  We are supposed to reject 
formalistic views of what it means and what it takes to participate in political 
processes.  The district court and majority opinions suggest that registering and re
registering to vote is an easy thing to do.  The way they see it, anyone who wants to 
register certainly can.  If that were true, if the task of filling out and submitting an 
application to register did not represent a substantial obstacle to political 
participation, the National Voter Registration Act would not exist.  As Representative 
Lewis put it: "[F]or many Americans, it is not easy to register to vote.  It is 
difficult."  139 Cong. Rec. H488 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993).  For that reason, Congress made 
"an effort to make democracy a little more real for all citizens of the United States."  
Id. at H490 (remarks of Rep. McKinney).  
 Courts applying § 2 of the Voting Rights Act must take a similar approach.  
Unless we ignore Congress's instructions, divorce ourselves from past and present reality, 
and adhere to a narrow and formalistic view of political opportunity, we will understand 
that the discriminatory effects of Pennsylvania's non-voting purge law are not cured or at 
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all alleviated by the fact that Latinos and blacks are free to reinstate themselves 
register after being purged from the registration rolls. 
 IV. 
 In Part III.C of its opinion, the majority devotes special attention to the 
district court's findings regarding the success that black and Latino candidates have had 
in Philadelphia elections.  It reads the district court's opinion to make "an explicit 
finding of fact that Philadelphia's minority population has not had difficulty electing 
minority representatives."  Maj. Op. Typescript at 22.  That finding, the majority seems 
to argue, precludes the plaintiffs from prevailing on their § 2 claim.  The majority has 
committed two significant errors here.  First, the district court did not make the finding 
the majority describes. Second, even if such a finding had been made, the majority has 
misinterpreted its legal significance. 
A. 
1.  What the District Court Did and Did Not (and Could Not) Find 
 Again, according to the majority, the district court "made an explicit finding 
that Philadelphia's minority population has not had difficulty electing minority 
representatives."  Id. (citing Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 539).  I disagree.  The section of 
the district court opinion to which the majority refers is headed: "The Extent to Which 
African-Americans and Latinos Have Been Elected to Public Office in Philadelphia."  
824 F. Supp. at 537.  The court's headings faithfully track the typically relevant factors 
listed in the Senate Report, which include "the extent to which members of the minority 
group have been elected to office in the jurisdiction."  Sen. Rep. at 29. Accordingly, the 
district court considered, and ultimately rejected, the plaintiffs' contention that 
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"minority candidates have experienced considerable difficulty being elected to public 
office in Philadelphia."  Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 537.  In supporting this conclusion, the 
court specifically mentioned minority representation in the state legislature and on the 
City Council.  Id. at 538.  Thus, the district court's discussion, as its heading 
indicated, described the extent to which blacks and Latinos had been elected to office in 
Philadelphia. 
 Somewhere in this section of the district court's opinion, the majority finds 
"an explicit finding of fact that the City's minority population has not had difficulty 
electing minority representatives."  The district court, however, never made any finding 
regarding -- and in fact, never mentioned -- the difficulty minority voters might have 
experienced in their efforts to elect candidates; instead, in keeping with the Senate 
Report's instructions, it considered the extent to which black and Latino candidates
won election to public office.  There is a substantial legal and factual difference 
between the difficulty experienced by minority candidates, which the district court 
considered, and the difficulty experienced by minority voters, which the district court 
neither considered nor addressed in a factual finding.0 
                     
0
 The majority's misreading of the district court's opinion is probably a result of 
the following sentence: "The Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to 
demonstrate that minority candidates experience difficulty electing representatives 
to office."  Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 538 (emphasis added).  Clearly, that statement 
contains a mistake.  The district court was not referring to a situation, such as 
that following a plurality vote in the electoral college, in which (successful) 
candidates for office are called upon to elect other representatives. There are two 
possible ways to make sense of the district court's misstatement: either the court 
meant to say "voters" instead of "candidates", or it meant to say "getting elected 
to office" instead of "electing representatives to office."  The first possibility, 
while perhaps the one the majority would prefer, is not realistic.  The district 
court's heading, its description and rejection of the plaintiffs' argument, its 
reliance on the Senate Report, and the content of its discussion -- in which it 
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 If this were a vote dilution case, the plaintiffs would have had to satisfy the 
Gingles threshold factors, the third of which requires proof "that the white majority 
votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it -- in the absence of special circumstances .
-- usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51.  Of 
course, this is not a vote dilution case, and I have already explained why the factors 
that are most relevant in that context are of little if any relevance here. Supra pp. 35
36.  Assuming, however, that the plaintiffs did need to make a showing regarding the 
difficulty they have experienced in electing their preferred representatives -- and as I 
discuss below, I believe the majority has erred in apparently concluding that they did 
need to do so -- they could not rely, and a district court could not base a finding, 
entirely on the win-loss records of minority candidates.  We have not lost sight of the 
encouraging fact that Latino and black constituents can and sometimes do prefer white 
candidates, even in elections where a minority candidate is also running.0  So, as we 
explained in Jenkins, "[w]hile it may be tempting to assume that a minority candidate is 
always the candidate of choice among minority voters, this is not always true."  Jenkins
4 F.3d at 1126; see generally id. at 1124-1131 (setting forth and applying the proper 
standards for determining which candidates are preferred by § 2 plaintiffs).  The success 
                                                                                          
referred only to candidates who had been elected, and never to voter preferences 
all point to the unmistakable conclusion that the court made a finding regarding the 
difficulty minority candidates had experienced in their efforts to get elected, and 
not the difficulty minority voters had experienced in their efforts to elect the 
candidates they supported. 
0
 Conversely, and of at least equal promise, whites can and do vote for minority 
candidates.  The record even reveals that such laudable events may occur, as one 
might hope, in the City of Brotherly Love; as the district court pointed out, two 
minority members of the Philadelphia City Council were elected in at-large contests.
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of black and Latino candidates, therefore, does not necessarily prove the success of black 
and Latino voters.0 
 Contrary to the majority's assertion, the district court did not find that 
minority voters had not experienced difficulty electing minority candidates; it merely 
concluded that, at least as far as the plaintiffs could prove, minority candidates had not 
experienced difficulty getting elected.0  We do not know which of those candidates were 
actually preferred by minority voters.  And even if the district court had found, as the 
majority claims, that minority voters experienced no difficulty electing candidates, that 
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 Section 2 plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing which candidates they have
preferred.  Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1126. Minority voters are not entitled to an 
unsupported assumption that the defeat of minority candidates, in and of itself, 
demonstrates the frustration of minority voting interests.  In this case, because 
the district court never considered whether black and Latino citizens had succeeded 
in electing representatives of their choice, we do not have any of the factual 
information a court would need to determine which candidates were preferred by 
minority constituents.  For example, we do not know anything about the losing 
candidates in elections where a black or Latino prevailed, nor do we have any idea 
if statistical or even anecdotal evidence supports the permissible inference that 
minority voters in fact preferred any given minority representative.  Again, in 
cases (unlike this one) where such a showing is necessary, the plaintiffs must make 
it. Here, however, it is the majority that equates the success of minority 
candidates with the success of minority voters. That assumption is not legally or 
factually sound. 
 
I am aware of the district court's finding that, as a general matter, voting in 
Philadelphia is racially polarized.  Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 532-33.  That finding, 
however, is insufficient to support a conclusion that minority voters preferred 
particular minority candidates. As we pointed out in Jenkins, this inquiry must be 
conducted "on an election-by-election basis."  Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1126. 
0
 Putting aside the majority's misunderstanding of whose experience (candidates' or 
voters') the district court was considering, it is worth noting that the court only 
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that someone had experienced some 
sort of political hardship. It did not, as the majority states, make an affirm
finding that no one had done so.  This second inaccuracy in the majority's version 
of the district court's finding may be more subtle, but it is not insignificant.
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finding could only have been based on the unsupported and legally erroneous assumption 
that blacks and Latinos always vote for blacks and Latinos.  Thus, such a finding could 
not survive review. 
2.  The Unanswered Need to Consider Special Circumstances 
 Assuming that the plaintiffs' case did depend on an independent showing that 
they have not been able to elect their preferred representatives (which it does not), and 
further assuming that minority voters always prefer minority candidates (which they do 
not), the district court's findings still would not defeat the plaintiffs' § 2 claim, 
because the court never considered the kinds of "special circumstances" that might 
undermine the legal significance of the minority representation it cited.  Gingles 
mandates that in determining whether § 2 plaintiffs have usually been prevented from 
electing their preferred candidates, courts take into account "special circumstances, such 
as the absence of an opponent, incumbency, or the utilization of bullet voting," which 
could explain the success of minority candidates even in the face of a districting scheme 
that unlawfully diluted the plaintiffs' vote.  Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57; see also Jenkins
4 F.3d at 1119 n.9 ("consideration of special circumstances is specifically mandated 
within the definition of the third Gingles factor").  As the Gingles Court took care to 
make clear, its "list of special circumstances is illustrative, not exclusive."  Gingles
478 U.S. at 57 n.26. 
 The uncontroverted evidence presented at trial showed that of the seven black or 
Latino representatives serving on the Philadelphia City Council, five were elected from 
"minority districts."  Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 537; id. at 538 (acknowledging that "some of 
the [minority] councilmembers represent wards that are highly populated by minority 
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constituents.")  The record does not reflect whether minority state legislators have also 
been elected largely from districts in which black or Latino citizens constituted a voting 
majority. Nor does it disclose whether other special circumstances, such as incumbency or 
the nature (or lack) of a candidate's opposition, might account for the success of 
minority candidates in some instances.   
 It seems obvious that the existence and effect of minority districts is the type 
of special circumstance that courts must take into account in determining whether minority 
voters have experienced difficulty electing their candidates of choice.  Of course, in the 
vote dilution context, this consideration will never arise.  Vote dilution claims 
invariably challenge districting schemes that do not provide minority voters with an 
effective voting majority.  A court could never learn anything about the occurrence of 
dilution by looking to the results of elections in districts where majority-minority 
constituencies controlled the outcome.  Outside the vote dilution context, however, the 
demographic composition of a district must be taken into account in assessing the effect 
of a challenged voting practice.  If a discriminatory law results in the 
disenfranchisement of a disproportionate number of minority voters, but the remaining 
voting members of the group still constitute an effective majority within a district, then 
plainly, the success of a minority candidate elected from that district would have no 
legal significance.  That result would not provide any indication whatsoever that the 
challenged law had not impaired the ability of minority voters to elect their chosen 
representatives.  Thus, the existence of majority-minority districts is the type of 
special circumstance that can explain, and thereby lessen or eliminate the significance 
of, the political success enjoyed by minority-preferred candidates. 
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 Here, the district court never considered the existence or effect of special 
circumstances such as majority-minority districts.  The evidence presented at trial, which 
the court described and at least partially credited in its opinion, would have supported a 
finding that these circumstances did exist.  In all likelihood, the district court never 
had any reason to conduct this sort of inquiry, because it was only considering the extent 
to which minority candidates had been elected to office; it was not making a finding 
regarding the difficulty minority voters had experienced in trying to elect 
representatives, which is entirely consistent with its conclusion that the Gingles 
preconditions were "peripheral issues bearing little relevance" in this case.  Ortiz
F. Supp. at 523.  However, if the district court had wanted to move from its findings of 
minority representation on local and state governing bodies, to a conclusion that legally 
significant minority political success disproved the plaintiffs' claim that their ability 
to influence the outcome of elections had been impaired, it would have needed to consider 
the presence of special circumstances.  A failure to do so would constitute reversible 
legal error.  Harvell v. Ladd, 958 F.2d 226, 230 (8th Cir. 1992) (reversing for failure to 
consider special circumstances).  While the district court did not commit such error, 
because of the limited nature of its findings, the majority does.  It briefly describes 
the electoral successes of black and Latino candidates, and concludes that those facts 
refute the suggestion that the plaintiffs either have been denied fair access to the 
political process or have suffered an impairment of their ability to influence the outcome 
of elections.  The majority fails to acknowledge the possibility that special 
circumstances could have accounted for the results on which it relies, despite the 
uncontroverted evidence that such circumstances did, in fact, exist.  Of course, appellate 
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courts are not competent to resolve this type of question on their own, but that is 
precisely what the majority would have to do in order to avoid its apparent error.0
B. 
 Even if I accepted the majority's account of what the district court found, I 
would not agree with its apparent view of that finding's significance.  
 I confess that I am not entirely sure I understand the legal argument that the 
majority advances in Part III.C of its opinion.  It at least strongly intimates, however, 
that the plaintiffs' failure to prove that they have experienced difficulty electing 
representatives, in and of itself, would preclude them from prevailing on a § 2 claim, and 
thus would provide an alternative ground for affirming the district court's decision.  If 
that is the majority's position, and if the majority is right, then any voting practice 
that prevented members of protected classes from participating in the political process 
in whatever manner, to whatever extent, and for whatever reason -- would be permissible 
under § 2, provided those groups could still eke out a reasonably fair share of election 
victories.  Thankfully, the Voting Rights Act allows no such thing. 
                     
0
 As a final point, by relying on Wilson Goode's mayoral victories in support of its 
position that minority voters have not had difficulty electing minority candidates, 
the majority has adjusted or reinterpreted the district court's findings.  Goode 
testified that he was the only black candidate, of the twelve who ran, to be elected 
mayor during the past thirty years.  Thus, when the district court found substantial 
minority representation in Philadelphia, it was in spite of Goode's success, not 
because of it.  Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 538 ("Although there has been one minority 
mayor over the past several years, the city council . . . ." (emphasis added)).  The 
majority's use of these findings is quite different. Instead of viewing Goode's 
mayoral victories, in their historical context, as facts that detract from but do 
not defeat an argument that minority candidates have achieved substantial success in 
Philadelphia elections, the majority cites Goode's victories as only supporting that 
position. 
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 The majority's legal argument, one of the two sources of Part III.C's troubles, 
itself contains two errors.  First, and most importantly, the majority has misread the 
Supreme Court's decision in Chisom v. Roemer, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991).  Second, it has 
again misconstrued § 2.  
 According to the majority, Chisom holds that "Section 2 plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that they had less opportunity both (1) to participate in the political 
process, and to elect representatives of their choice."  Maj. Op. Typescript at 21 
(emphasis added); see also Maj. Op. Typescript at 23 (referring to "both elements of a 
Section 2 claim").  Its discussion in Part III.C seems to focus on the second of those 
requirements; by pointing to the electoral successes enjoyed by Latino and black 
candidates, the majority suggests that the plaintiffs failed to prove that their ability 
to influence the outcome of elections --or, in other words, their ability to elect 
representatives of their choice -- has been impaired.  Maj. Op. Typescript at 22.0 Because 
of this purported failure, the majority concludes, the plaintiffs have "failed to satisfy 
both elements of a § 2 cause of action and, accordingly, [have] failed to establish a 
basis upon which [their] requested relief could be granted."  Maj. Op. Typescript at 23.  
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 Part III.C does contain a brief reference to a district court "finding of minority 
participation in the political process." Maj. Op. Typescript at 22 (citing Ortiz
824 F. Supp. at 539).  However, the "finding" the majority has in mind could only be 
the district court's statement of its ultimate conclusion, where it simply echoes 
the language of § 2 in holding that no violation occurred.  That "finding" (which 
appears under the heading "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW") cannot support itself.  In any 
event, once again, the majority's argument only relies on the findings regarding 
electoral results.  It is the success of minority candidates, it reasons, that 
demonstrates that minority voters have not been denied either fair access to the 
political process or an equal opportunity to influence the outcome of elections.
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 In the part of Chisom on which the majority relies, the Supreme Court addressed 
the position "that § 2 provides two distinct types of protection for minority voters 
protects their opportunity `to participate in the political process' and their opportunity 
to elect representatives of their choice.'" Chisom, 115 L.Ed.2d at 364.  The majority of 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, had adopted that view in League of 
United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(en banc) ("LULAC"), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas
115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991) (companion case to Chisom).  The LULAC majority determined that the 
word "representatives," as used in the phrase "to elect representatives of their choice," 
did not include judges.  Consequently, it held that § 2 plaintiffs could not challenge a 
districting scheme that allegedly prevented them from electing the judicial candidates 
they preferred.  However, because the word "representatives" did not limit the first of 
the two distinct protections that, according to the LULAC majority, § 2 provided --
namely, the opportunity to participate in the political process -- a voting practice or 
procedure that compromised minority voters' opportunities to participate in judicial 
elections remained subject to challenge.  Chisom describes the Fifth Circuit's rationale 
as follows:  
[A] standard, practice, or procedure in a judicial election, such as a 
limit on the times that polls are open, which has a disparate impact 
on black voters' opportunity to cast their ballots under § 2, may be 
challenged even if a different practice that merely affects their 
opportunity to elect representatives of their choice to judicial 
office may not. 
Chisom, 115 L.Ed.2d at 364.  The construction of § 2 the majority appears to adopt in Part 
III.C is similar but more demanding. Like the LULAC court, it divides § 2; the opportunity 
to participate, in its view, is distinct from the opportunity to elect.  Unlike the 
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court, however, the majority reads § 2 to contain two "elements," each of which a 
plaintiff must satisfy in order to prevail, rather than two alternative "protections"; 
thus, while the Fifth Circuit required plaintiffs to prove only one of two different 
abridgements of political opportunity, the majority here requires proof of both. 
 The Supreme Court rejected both majority positions --the one advanced in 
and the one advanced here.  According to Chisom, the Fifth Circuit had erroneously 
attempted "to divide a unitary claim created by Congress."  Chisom, 115 L.Ed.2d at 365.  
The majority of this panel has done precisely the same thing.  However, as the Chisom
Court put it, § 2 cannot be compelled to undergo the "radical surgery [that] would be 
required to separate the opportunity to participate from the opportunity to elect." 
364.  "The statute does not," the Court explained, "create two separate and distinct 
rights."  Id. Rather: "Any abridgement of the opportunity of members of a protected class 
to participate in the political process inevitably impairs their ability to influence the 
outcome of an election."  Id. (emphasis added).  As the Court had stated in White v. 
Register and Whitcomb v. Chavis, Chisom continues, "the opportunity to participate and the 
opportunity to elect [are] inextricably linked."  Id. at 365 (emphasis added) (citing 
White, 412 U.S. at 766, and Whitcomb, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971)).   
 Thus, in Chisom, the Court clearly and repeatedly rejected the majority's 
apparent view that § 2 plaintiffs must satisfy each of two distinct elements (lesser 
opportunity both to participate and to elect) in order to prevail.  Instead, if such 
plaintiffs can prove that a voting law has abridged their opportunity to participate in 
the political process -- by, for example, removing them from the registration rolls and 
thus effectively nullifying their franchise -- that law has also necessarily and 
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"inevitably" impaired the plaintiffs' ability to influence the outcome of an election.  
Such is the nature of the "unitary claim" Congress created.  Under this sensible and well
supported construction of § 2, a voting practice is impermissible if it operates to deny 
the members of a protected class of an equal opportunity to participate in the political 
process -- even if the group has managed to overcome that disadvantage and to elect 
representatives of its choice.0  
 The majority does not agree.  Again, looking exclusively to electoral results, 
it concludes that the plaintiffs cannot prevail, because there is no evidence that the 
purge law has denied them fair access to the political process or impaired their ability 
to influence the outcome of elections. Maj. Op. Typescript at 22.  This position could be 
based on one of several rationales, none of which are availing.  Perhaps the majority 
disagrees with, or has overlooked, Chisom's use of words like "inevitably" and 
"inextricably linked", which describe the relationship between the abridgement of a 
group's opportunity to participate in the political process, on the one hand, and the 
impairment of that group's ability to elect representatives, on the other.  Chisom, 115 
L.Ed.2d at 364.  The majority would apparently require the plaintiffs to produce evidence 
of a connection that, at least according to Chisom, necessarily exists as a matter of law 
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 This is not the way Justice Scalia read the Court's opinion.  In fact, Justice 
Scalia criticized the Chisom majority for construing § 2 in such a way that members 
of a minority group that was not large enough to control the outcome of elections, 
but who nonetheless had suffered an abridgement of their opportunity to participate 
in the political process, would not be protected.  Chisom, 115 L.Ed.2d at 372 
(Scalia, J. dissenting).  The Chisom majority, however, expressly rejected that 
interpretation of its opinion.  Id. at 365 n.24.  Thus, regardless of whether 
Justice Scalia's criticism had merit, not one member of the Court was willing to 
adopt a construction of § 2 under which a measure that operated to abridge a group's 
opportunity to participate, but that did not itself prevent that group from electing 
representatives, would be permissible. 
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and logic.  Alternatively, the majority might believe that by purging people from the 
registration rolls, the City has not in any way lessened their opportunity to participate 
in the political process.  But I would hope we could agree about this much: when 
individuals are purged, they cannot vote; if they cannot vote, their opportunity to 
participate is diminished; and, once again, according to the Supreme Court, if their 
opportunity to participate is diminished, their ability to elect their preferred 
representatives is necessarily, "inevitably" impaired. A final possibility remains.  The 
majority might simply be restating, in a somewhat oblique way, its view that in order to 
establish a violation of § 2, the plaintiffs would have had to establish that the purge 
law itself operates to prevent Latinos and blacks from voting and that, therefore, the law 
is entirely responsible for its discriminatory effect.  If that is the majority's purpose, 
however, then the argument advanced in Part III.C would not provide any additional support 
for its conclusion, and thus would not require a response. 
 In arguing that the plaintiffs' failure to prove difficulty electing 
representatives defeats their claim, the majority not only misreads Chisom; it also
again, misreads § 2.  The district court, in contrast, recognized that the success black 
and Latino candidates have had in winning public office is merely one factor among others 
that are relevant in a § 2 inquiry.  As § 2(b) quite plainly states: "The extent to which 
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political 
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered."  42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (emphasis 
added).0 According to the majority's apparent view, however, that circumstance is somehow 
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 As I state above, supra p. 36, the extent to which minority voters have experienced 
difficulty electing candidates of their choice -- and thus relatedly, the extent to 
which minority candidates have won election to office -- is one relevant factor, 
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dispositive.  Maj. Op. Typescript at 22-23.  Congress disagrees.  Sen. Rep. at 29 n.118 
(rejecting the notion that a failure "to establish any particular factor" defeats a §
claim).  The Supreme Court disagrees.  See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (recognizing that no 
particular number of factors need be proved, but that § 2 analysis instead depends on a 
searching practical evaluation of past and present reality and on a functional view of the 
political process).  I disagree as well. 
V. 
 Congress, in its continued efforts to ensure that the democratic processes 
occurring in this country will be equally open to members of racial and language 
minorities, has had the good sense to prohibit non-voting purges in federal elections. The 
legislation it recently enacted to eliminate "discriminatory and unfair registration laws" 
does not overlook laws such as the one the plaintiffs have challenged in this case.  Thus, 
when the National Voter Registration Act becomes effective, Pennsylvania will no longer be 
able to remove individuals from the registration rolls because of their failure to vote.  
See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973gg-6(b)(2).0  As I stated at the outset, however, I am concerned 
                                                                                          
among others, that a court can take into account in assessing the effect and 
legality of a non-voting purge law.  Political success could well encourage 
participation, while repeated failure could lead to disillusionment, alienation, and 
the belief that voting is pointless.  Therefore, because this factor might influence 
minority participation rates, it is a relevant consideration in a challenge to a law 
that disenfranchises those who fail to vote.  The extent of a group's political 
success, however, while relevant, is not of central importance among the 
circumstances that affect its members' inclination or ability to participate, and is 
certainly not anything approaching a threshold or essential factor that § 2 
plaintiffs must establish in order to successfully challenge a non-voting purge law.
0The statute provides:  
 
Any State program or activity to protect the integrity of the 
electoral process by ensuring the maintenance of an accurate and 
current voter registration roll for elections for Federal office . . . 
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that today's decision will reach beyond its context and misdirect future efforts to 
properly apply the Voting Rights Act.   
 The majority makes a valid and important observation: the law, in various ways, 
has indeed "sought to raze any enduring bastions of state-administered voting 
discrimination."  Maj. Op. Typescript at 18-19.  We cannot discount the achievement that 
separates Philadelphia, Mississippi in 1964 from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1994.  
However, the goal the majority describes, and in which it undoubtedly believes, has not 
been attained. Even after Congress's most recent contribution to the cause of equal 
political opportunity, discrimination in voting remains.  A proper application of the 
Voting Rights Act in this case would have resulted in precisely the kind of additional 
progress the Act was intended to bring about. 
 According to the majority, the right to vote, "the very essence of democratic 
society," has now been "extended to every American citizen, without regard to race . . . 
."  Maj. Op. Typescript at 18.  That accomplishment loses meaning, however, when 
discriminatory voting laws make the right to vote harder for some to exercise than others.   
When such discrimination occurs, I fear that today's decision will make it more difficult 
for us to respond in the way the law requires.  To borrow a phrase from a particularly 
meaningful source, there is "unfinished work" to be done before we achieve the equality 
                                                                                          
shall not result in the removal of any person from the official list 
of voters registered to vote in an election for Federal office by 
reason of the person's failure to vote. 
 
42 U.S.C.S. § 1973gg-6(b).  Theoretically, states and localities could creatively 
struggle to avoid this mandate by maintaining separate registration rolls for federal 
elections.  At oral argument, the City stated that it had no intention of making such 
a determined and impractical effort to preserve, as best it can, the non-voting purge 
law. 
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mandated by § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.0  Because this case demonstrates that fact, I 
respectfully dissent. 
                     
0
 See Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863), in 2 
Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed., 1989). 
Appropriately, the "unfinished work" to which Lincoln referred was the preservation 
of democratic government. The debates preceding the enactment of the most recent 
voting rights legislation show that Lincoln continues to inform our ideals about 
political participation.  E.g., 139 Cong. Rec. S2471 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1993) 
(remarks of Sen. Bradley); id. at H506 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993) (remarks of Rep. 
Thomas). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
